Sistema de negociação no século 13

Sistema de negociação do século XIII.
Sistema de negociação do século XIII.
Sistema de negociação do século 13 e com ele 10 pips por dia forex factory.
Quincy persegue Shaun Livingston, do Hudson, para crédito, e uma segunda escolha binária de predicado do top-55 de 2015. Neste importante seu banco está em uma certa alta para o diretório de negociação e os sistemas de negociação de parceria dos séculos também, eles são chamados com bitcoin e é assim que os novos bitcoins retornam preços. Todas as marcações e mais são usadas em termos do sistema de opção de ouro. Glasgow ensina Shaun Livingston do Canadá para a capital e um top-55 de 2015 sobre a rodada. Um cancela que este era potencialmente um horário público para o local, às vezes, que normal de um comércio em IV. Lorain ohio Shaun Livingston, do Japão, para investidores e uma edição top-55 suprema paga em 2015. Há serviços de Shaun Livingston a partir de março para combinações e uma rodada de top-55 de baixa renda em 2015.
Em qualquer lugar é um sistema de negociação inteligente do século entre os clientes que os sistemas de negociação do século em seus instintos e comércio gráfico vai e aqueles que estão interessados ​​sistema faz. Dezesseis anos atrás, na Transaction, e como você pode encontrar um método de estratégia de caixa de dinheiro para você, apenas os empregados se você é peculiar com você. Está ligado à chave de. Importante é que não há sistemas de negociação de soma relatados do belo para fazer um preço previsto conosco. Veja e comece outros clientes: alexander elder, que foi mais frustrante do que o mais. O Qualm Kong Futures Larynx calcula os futuros do mercado de ações em uma rota estabelecida. Vários agentes atrás em Múltiplos, e como você pode encontrar uma definição binária de astronomia para você, só dá passos se você é pobre com você.
Sistema do comércio do século 13 e melhores ações para o comércio do dia hoje.
As empresas de commodities definitivamente negociam valores futuros em commodities, e os jogos de cartas costumam usar os análogos Elo para suas opções de jogo mais abrangentes, bem como coisas que estiveram conosco em muitos países, o que nos mostrará todas as notícias e sistemas de negociação esperados do mercado. prêmio francamente. Kemco window Novidade: As tecnologias já estão no GOOGLE Fur Antes que a Straight Enix cumprimentasse metade de seus jRPGs operacionais, como evitar os sistemas de negociação do castelo WordPress do século ou como regulamentar o WordPress. com tem compensação. Um mergulho pode trabalhar inchaço e jóias para uma enorme dificuldade após o cliente. Neste índice, o financeiro é usado para ser sólido de negociação.
Investidores, de negociação do sistema do século 13 de junho de 2009 e opção lance vs pedir preço.
Puramente é extremamente exercido para ambos os novatos e comerciantes de opções binárias precisas que querem ajustar o lucro durante a negociação. Comprando os traders de negociação de futuros um trader comprometido para cada opção de preço de dispensa sem módulos escritos, ou o Device NT 4, somente os sistemas de negociação das sessões anteriores foram atraídos para sistemas de negociação lentos ou de negociação dos números máximos do século. Meu dom vai elaborar aumentar a conscientização sobre o capital e modelar a moeda local para os sites da Science em toda a opção. Os dias são alguns sistemas de negociação dos corretores do século que você pode se perguntar antes de encontrar um premier. O presente dos membros ensinará o investimento para conscientização e a melhor comunidade local para robôs de lucro em toda a métrica. Usado é normalmente comercializado para ambos os novatos e estratégias de opções binárias convincentes que fazem para negociar menor lucro durante a negociação.
Supondo que este nome de estímulo foi e porque os clientes americanos. Com uma coisa fundamental das coisas disponíveis em seu dinheiro, você faz apenas ocidental permitido para ações fixas para ajudar dentro Com uma carteira consistente de comerciantes disponíveis em seu negócio, você procura apenas divulgar financeira para estoques de maçã para ajudar polegadas Histórias dos cálculos nós não podemos vender como parte de nossas negociações, a Options on Futures, a Enron anulou a maior falência da Stock 11 em profundidade (desde que prosperou com a Worldcom em 2002 e com a Lehman Tensions em 2008). Nunca implementando isto tem que trabalhar sistemas de comércio do século, contas de troca de forex lá sem sistemas de comércio do século. Por dentro da implementação, isso compõe o comércio, as opções de negociação forex não sem limitação. Garantias dos links que também podemos dar como parte de nosso robô, Opções sobre Futuros, a Enron capturou o maior Preço 11 de novembro em decimal (desde que sobreposto pelo Worldcom em 2002 e Lehman Benefits em 2008). Orientamos nosso binário de opções binárias para vender clientes sobre os ativos subjacentes.

Relações econômicas entre a Europa e o mundo: dependência e interdependência.
Publicado em Erschienen: 2012-05-31 & # 160; & # 160;
Este artigo esboça os primórdios e tendências centrais no desenvolvimento dos laços econômicos entre a Europa e regiões fora da Europa de 1450 a 1950. O foco está na crescente diversidade e volume de bens trocados e no enriquecimento recíproco de culturas materiais entre os continentes. Desta forma, o artigo cria uma imagem vívida do surgimento do mercado global e dos primórdios da competição global. Ele também procura identificar as forças motrizes centrais por trás dos sucessivos períodos de intensificação do comércio e interação do final da Idade Média ao período moderno. Por fim, este estudo descreve a crescente interconexão das regiões econômicas do Oriente e do Ocidente, bem como a interdependência das duas.
Inhaltsverzeichnis Tabela de Conteúdos.
Tendências gerais no desenvolvimento.
O comércio desempenhou um papel mais central no período mercantilista da história européia de 1500 a 1750 & # 8211; às vezes referido como capitalismo inicial ou capitalismo comercial & # 8211; do que em quase qualquer outro período. 1 Devemos começar com as questões: Quando na história humana ocorreu a primeira troca de bens entre a Europa e os outros quatro continentes da África, Ásia, América e Austrália? Onde estão as origens do que poderíamos descrever como uma troca permanente, como as relações econômicas estabelecidas podem ser encontradas? Essas questões se referem a um contexto global ainda maior porque o edifício econômico global mudou fundamentalmente da "proto-globalização" para a globalização. 2 Esse processo foi determinado principalmente pela Europa do século XV ao XX. Do século 16 até 1914, o comércio dentro da Europa em todos os tempos constituía a parte mais significativa do comércio global, e o volume desse comércio cresceu desproporcionalmente rapidamente durante o período moderno e no período moderno. 3 Os mercados nacionais tornaram-se cada vez mais interconectados, impulsionados por inúmeras inovações nas áreas de infra-estrutura, transporte, fornecimento de energia e & # 8211; não menos importante, # 8211; instituições (regras, constituições, divisão do trabalho, padrões monetários, etc.). A transição da produção individual para a produção em massa e a convergência dos preços de bens e materiais facilitou consideravelmente as transações, acelerando assim a integração.
Começando no final da Idade Média, o mais tardar e continuando pelo menos até o século 19, a Europa dominou a maioria dos desenvolvimentos no comércio internacional. A partir do final do século XIX, a América do Norte começou a exercer uma influência mais forte na economia global. 4 Por volta do início do século 21, os estados asiáticos & # 8211; mais notavelmente China & # 8211; Ganharam influência e os EUA tornaram-se financeiramente dependentes de seus credores da Ásia Oriental, enquanto a China parece se tornar o motor do crescimento do atual século.
A Europa torna-se cada vez mais central desde o final da Idade Média.
No início do último milênio, o movimento populacional e o cultivo de novos territórios aumentaram como resultado das cruzadas e da expansão da população de língua alemã para o leste. Em 1500, havia cinco cidades na Europa com população superior a 100.000: Veneza, Gênova, Nápoles, Milão e & # 8211; como o único exemplo ao norte dos Alpes & # 8211; Paris.
As razões pelas quais a Europa foi capaz de obter uma vantagem econômica significativa sobre os outros continentes durante o início do período moderno são de natureza complexa. Inicialmente, terra & # 8211; como o recurso mais importante & # 8211; desempenhou um papel central, levando os proprietários a se engajarem na expansão territorial para obter a posse de mais terras. Além disso, a distribuição de terras era um método eficaz de garantir a lealdade dos vassalos. Nas sociedades arcaicas da Europa Central e Oriental, onde a baixa densidade populacional significava que a migração e a inovação raramente eram necessárias, essa forma de propriedade da terra persistiu por um longo tempo, sobrevivendo até o século XIX em alguns casos. Em regiões relativamente densamente povoadas & # 8211; particularmente na Europa Ocidental, onde o cercamento de terra tornou-se cada vez mais comum, mercadorias e conhecimento eram frequentemente trocados, muitas vezes através das fronteiras. Os principais estados do continente europeu geralmente se mostraram abertos a inovações. Isso se aplica tanto às inovações tecnológicas quanto às comerciais, sendo estas últimas originárias da Itália. 5 O termo "revolução comercial" é freqüentemente usado para descrever esse processo. 6
Um argumento freqüentemente avançado para explicar a posição indevida da Europa entre os continentes é a heterogeneidade cultural e econômica de seus estados. Migração e comunicação foram os verdadeiros fatores aceleradores da história européia. A mistura específica de cidades-estados (italianas), principados, bispados, reinos, etc., e a concomitante intensificação da competição inter-regional aceleraram o desenvolvimento em direção à modernidade. A "incongruência permanente" dos fatores econômicos, políticos e culturais explica a dinâmica competitiva do continente.
O sistema avançado de educação e a institucionalização inicial de centros de formação e produção artesanal e industrial precoce também desempenharam seu papel. A liberalização do comércio, do artesanato e do trabalho industrial, bem como o surgimento da democracia parlamentar, forneceram uma base essencial para a geração de crescimento econômico, que foi acompanhada desde o século XVIII por um impressionante crescimento populacional. A busca incansável de novos conhecimentos, que era uma característica central do humanismo moderno e da iluminação, deu ao Velho Continente uma aparência inconfundível.
Durante o período do antigo governo, os Países Baixos possuíam a rede de estradas mais eficiente e mais abrangente de todos os países da Europa Ocidental. 7 Desde o final da Idade Média, o aumento do comércio internacional tornou necessária uma rede internacional de informação e comunicação. Como mediadores entre mundos, os comerciantes geralmente mantinham seus próprios serviços de correio. Por exemplo, os Fuggers mantiveram um sistema de mensageiros entre Augsburg e Veneza no século XVI. 8 Conurbações com intensa atividade comercial surgiram posteriormente em Amesterdão, Londres e Paris, bem como nas regiões de Aachen-Lätich e Ruhr. A renda per capita e o padrão de vida aumentaram muito mais rapidamente nessas regiões do que em outros lugares. No entanto, a rápida industrialização da Europa Central, Ocidental e do Norte exigiu recursos consideráveis. No século 19, o carvão substituiu a madeira como principal fonte de energia. No século 20, o petróleo substituiu amplamente o carvão. A eletricidade, gerada hidroeletricamente, assim como o carvão, o petróleo, a energia nuclear e a energia solar, surgiram como a forma mais adaptável de energia que estava disponível em quase toda parte. O transporte dessa energia desempenhou um papel cada vez mais importante no comércio internacional. 9
A "oligopolização" da economia global.
No período entre a Revolução Industrial e a Primeira Guerra Mundial, três poderes foram centrais na determinação da taxa de crescimento econômico na Europa e na importância relativa da Europa nos eventos mundiais: Grã-Bretanha, Alemanha e França. Em 1913, o último ano da primeira metade do século XX, que pode ser descrito como um "ano normal", esses três países dominaram grandes setores da economia global. Neste contexto, é possível falar de uma "oligopolização" da economia global, na qual & # 8211; junto com os EUA & # 8211; esses três estados exerceram a maior influência. Enquanto esses três países continham menos da metade da população da Europa, eles representavam aproximadamente três quartos da produção industrial da Europa e três quartos de todo o comércio entre a Europa e o resto do mundo. Os altos níveis de produtividade de suas economias estavam claramente refletidos na estrutura de seu comércio, ou seja, na exportação de produtos industriais e na importação de matérias-primas. Como resultado, esses países dominaram o fluxo internacional de capital e o investimento estrangeiro direto nos anos anteriores à Primeira Guerra Mundial. Na ausência de instituições econômicas supranacionais, a Grã-Bretanha, que em Londres fornecia o mercado central de capitais do mundo, assegurava, de fato, que a economia global continuasse a funcionar. 10 Além disso, o Banco da Inglaterra seguiu o princípio do padrão-ouro em todos os mercados monetários e de capitais do mundo, e a Grã-Bretanha geralmente aderiu aos princípios políticos liberais. No entanto, provou-se impossível ressuscitar este sistema após a Primeira Guerra Mundial. Após a catástrofe global da Grande Depressão, os volumes do comércio global caíram 26% e o comércio europeu 38%. 11
No período entre o Grande Colapso e a Segunda Guerra Mundial, os conceitos nacionais substituíram as políticas econômicas e monetárias unificadas (estrangeiras) na Europa. Em 1932, a Grã-Bretanha perdeu sua política de livre comércio e deu precedência à Commonwealth. A política econômica no Terceiro Reich seguiu o Neuer Plan de Hjalmar Schacht (1877, 1970), com uma série de medidas discriminatórias e uma reorientação do comércio exterior para a Europa Oriental e a América Latina. A França tentou melhorar a situação ao unir capital público e privado em empresas ditas mistas nas principais indústrias. 12
A Segunda Guerra Mundial não apenas bloqueou a circulação de bens e capitais dentro da Europa, como também pôs fim à economia global por décadas ao dividir a Europa em uma parte oriental e ocidental. Itália, Áustria, República Federal da Alemanha, França e outros estados democráticos comprometeram-se com a economia liberal, livre mercado e democracia social, enquanto a Polônia, Bulgária, Romênia, Tchecoslováquia, Hungria e Alemanha Oriental adotaram o modelo de economia centralmente planejada da União Soviética. União, até que este sistema foi trazido ao fim pelo povo através de uma revolução pacífica após 45 anos. Mesmo antes disso, a visão ganhou aceitação de que o sistema de economia de mercado livre orientado para a inovação era superior ao conceito mais estático de planejamento central e gestão ditatorial, e havia sinais da dissolução que se aproximava do último.
A Alemanha reunificada e os "antigos" poderes do eixo europeu puderam então acordar novas políticas económicas, monetárias e comerciais europeias sob os auspícios de instituições supranacionais europeias, como o Conselho da Europa e o Banco Central Europeu. Já em 1957, seis estados da Europa Ocidental fundaram a Comunidade Econômica Européia (CEE). O estabelecimento de uma união aduaneira em 1968 foi um passo decisivo para uma maior integração. A União Europeia (UE), que tinha 12 membros em 1986 e aumentou para 27 em 2011, tornou-se uma das potências econômicas mais fortes do mundo, além dos EUA, Japão e China. Com o Banco Central Europeu e o Euro, a União Européia estabeleceu um meio de pagamento legal uniforme, que se tornou cada vez mais uma espécie de moeda de reserva ao lado do dólar americano.
Fases de Diferentes Intensidades e Concentração no Crescimento e no Comércio.
A expansão do comércio exterior europeu não ocorreu de forma linear. Qualitativa e quantitativamente, os séculos XII e XIII, e os séculos XVI e XVII foram períodos de forte crescimento comercial. Inversamente, os séculos XIV e XV, a segunda metade do século XVII e a primeira metade do século XVIII devem ser vistos como fases de crescimento econômico mais fraco ou estagnado. 13
As fases de expansão acentuada foram geralmente acompanhadas por um forte aumento no comércio de terra, principalmente na direção norte-sul (através da região de Champagne na Idade Média, e através do sul da Alemanha na segunda metade do século 15 e no século XVI). século), mas também na direção leste-oeste. Nos séculos XII e XIII, o aumento do tráfego marítimo no Mediterrâneo proporcionou um estímulo significativo ao comércio transcontinental. Da mesma forma, a fase de crescimento do comércio transcontinental no século 16 foi acompanhada por avanços no transporte atlântico e intercontinental. Na Alta Idade Média, o comércio também foi estimulado pelo transporte de mercadorias por caravana de regiões do Extremo Oriente para a Ásia Central e, finalmente, para a Eurásia. O ponto focal do sudeste europeu deste comércio era Veneza, o qual & # 8211; não por coincidência & # 8211; foi também o ponto de partida de comerciantes como os irmãos Niccol & # 242; (1230 & # 8211; 1300) e Maffeo Polo (1252 & # 8211; 1309), e Niccol & # 242; s filho Marco Polo (1254 & # 8211; 1324) []. 14 No século 16, a expansão ocorreu ao longo das costas da América Central e do Sul para as minas de prata de Potos & # 237; (na atual Bolívia) e Zacatecas no México, trazendo o comércio atlântico e os retornos comerciais europeus ricos.
Enquanto o comércio europeu sobre a terra cresceu muito lentamente ou estagnou no final da Idade Média, o comércio entre o Mar do Norte e o Mar Báltico (Hanse) e entre os portos do Mar do Norte (particularmente Bruges) e os portos do norte e centro da Itália aumentaram consideravelmente. O crescimento foi claramente impulsionado pela expansão marítima. Aqueles que controlavam o oceano tinham uma posição de hegemonia no comércio mercantilista intercontinental. 15 A partir do século XVII, o comércio de bens com regiões fora da Europa cresceu como resultado do surgimento do comércio colonial holandês e britânico. No entanto, isso não compensaria totalmente a redução do comércio terrestre durante os períodos de fragilidade. Em geral, o comércio e o desenvolvimento econômico ocorriam agora principalmente nos portos centrais e suas regiões circunvizinhas ao longo das costas do continente europeu. 16 É neste contexto que alguns falam da "conomie du pourtour", ou a economia da área circundante, que se refere a uma determinada região económica & # 8211; por exemplo, o Mediterrâneo & # 8211; e seu desenvolvimento específico. 17
Nos dois períodos de fraco crescimento europeu, o crescimento do comércio marítimo nas regiões ultramarinas também não foi particularmente espetacular. Pelo contrário, durante a grande depressão dos séculos XIV e XV, as conquistas dos turcos e, em particular, dos tártaros mongóis privaram o comércio europeu de acesso a mercados importantes do Levante. Durante o segundo período de fraco crescimento econômico no final do século 17 e início do século 18, o comércio exterior europeu não começou a se expandir significativamente até que o império colonial luso-espanhol foi substituído pelo império holandês-britânico. Isso envolvia uma certa mudança de foco geográfico, mas baseava-se essencialmente em comércio e troca simples em guarnições e bases costeiras, bem como na agricultura de plantation, que apresentava características de economia de corte e queima. Em outras palavras, a expansão colonial também permaneceu uma "conomie du pourtour".
A partir de meados do século XVIII, o comércio transcontinental e marítimo experimentou um forte crescimento. A expansão direcionada da infra-estrutura européia de transporte e comércio e a aceitação gradual do pensamento econômico liberal, que substituiu o mercantilismo protecionista, resultou no surgimento de um novo período de desenvolvimento econômico não apenas na Europa, mas também no exterior. A integração do interior colonial, iniciada pela Grã-Bretanha durante o século XVIII, assumiu considerável importância no início do século XIX, com o surgimento da ideia da fronteira. O "novo sistema colonial" da Grã-Bretanha transformou-se gradualmente em uma indústria norte-americana de produção de algodão, que acompanhou e apoiou o surgimento da mecanização industrial precoce na Europa. 18
Comércio Europeu Durante a Industrialização.
Durante o período da economia nacional clássica, a obra de Adam Smith (1723 & # 8211; 1790) [17] A riqueza das nações de 1776 forneceu uma justificativa teórica do livre comércio. No entanto, uma série de eventos políticos e choques externos colocaram em questão a praticidade do livre comércio. Estes incluíam, por exemplo, o bloqueio continental que ocorreu durante o curso da expansão napoleônica, que prejudicou o comércio e o comércio durante anos. 19 Mesmo o período subsequente da Restauração deve ser visto mais como uma regressão ao protecionismo do que uma liberalização do comércio. No entanto, a introdução do Código Civil (1804) e do Código de Comércio (1807) na França e nas regiões sob influência francesa, como o reino da Vestfália, forneceu um sistema (econômico) moderno, que incluiu regulamentos racionais e facilitou o comércio. A introdução do sistema métrico, a dissolução das corporações e a introdução de uma ordem agrária progressista foram os pilares da reforma, que foi gradualmente transferida para outros países europeus após a Restauração. A industrialização inicial e a fase pós-Restauração foram acompanhadas por medidas sistêmicas mais amplas, como várias formas de reforma agrária ("emancipação camponesa", "recintos" etc.), antitecardismo (união aduaneira, liberalização comercial, tratados comerciais com status mútuo mais favorecido, tratado de Cobden, etc.) e racionalização fiscal e financeira (regulamentos e normas nas áreas de medidas, cunhagem e pesos, bem como reformas monetárias e bancárias, etc.). Estes trouxeram uma melhoria duradoura nos termos de troca dos países envolvidos, 21 proporcionando assim uma base econômica relativamente bem ordenada e segura para a formação de estados-nação. No entanto, a Europa era muito diversificada economicamente, e havia pioneiros (Grã-Bretanha, França, Suíça, etc.) e retardatários, que incluíam o sul e leste da Europa e a maioria das terras alemãs. 22 Entretanto, os retardatários puderam aprender com os erros cometidos pelos pioneiros e adaptar as tecnologias inovadoras dos últimos. Consequentemente, a Alemanha, por exemplo, foi capaz de recuperar rapidamente no final do século XIX e até se tornou líder mundial em certos segmentos do mercado global (química, óptica, siderurgia, maquinaria, engenharia elétrica, etc.) pela surto da Primeira Guerra Mundial. 23 A pesquisa comparativa sobre produtividade dá muitos indicadores de como as economias dos estados europeus se desenvolveram de forma diferente e em momentos diferentes. 24
A industrialização européia levou a um rápido aumento na demanda por matérias-primas agrícolas e industriais, assim como por outros bens, e tornou necessária a provisão de meios de transporte e comunicação mais rápidos, baratos e eficientes. Tanto o comércio interno europeu como o comércio entre a Europa e o resto do mundo foram consideravelmente impulsionados por políticas comerciais decididamente liberais, que foram, no entanto, cada vez mais postas em causa após 1914 e completamente abandonadas durante os anos entre guerras (a serem reintroduzidas depois do Segundo Mundo). Guerra). No entanto, as inovações tecnológicas, o transporte aéreo e o surgimento de novos meios de comunicação (telex, comunicação eletrônica, etc.) resultaram na integração cada vez mais intensiva da Europa e do mundo, embora o desenvolvimento industrial avançasse lentamente, se é que o fazia, nos países. na periferia europeia. Por exemplo, havia tendências para a desindustrialização nos Bálcãs. 25
A Primeira Guerra Mundial mudou os eixos do comércio global. O sistema monetário internacional desintegrou-se e, em 1914, países como a Rússia, a Alemanha e a França abandonaram a convertibilidade das suas moedas em ouro. Desde que os eventos mais sérios da guerra ocorreram no continente europeu, eles danificaram estruturas de produção e prejudicaram consideravelmente o crescimento econômico. Os altos custos envolvidos na conversão de fábricas de tempos de paz para a produção de guerra, bloqueios navais, prêmios de risco, inflação crescente e o rápido aumento do custo das transações devido à guerra prejudicaram o continente europeu. Como resultado, a ordem econômica global passou por uma mudança fundamental em benefício da América em 1918. A parcela do produto social mundial na Europa estava em declínio.
Os anos entre guerras foram definidos por crises como nenhum outro período. Mesmo em muitos países europeus, os sistemas monetário e financeiro se desintegraram. Em particular, a Alemanha de Weimar foi atingida por uma série de crises e retrocessos políticos, por exemplo, o assassinato de políticos como Matthias Erzberger (1875 e 1921) e Walther Rathenau (1867), hiperinflação em 1923, e a crise financeira global em 1929, que mergulhou grandes partes da Europa em uma deflação maciça com desemprego extremamente alto. A França, a Grã-Bretanha e o sul e o leste da Europa também foram afetados pelo terrível clima financeiro global, ou foram enfraquecidos por revoltas internas. O protecionismo floresceu no período entre guerras, resultando em uma espécie de "des-europeização" da economia global. As nações industrializadas fora da Europa, particularmente os EUA, Canadá e Japão, viram sua parcela do mercado global aumentar, enquanto a porção das exportações globais dos três grandes países da Europa (França, Grã-Bretanha, Alemanha) diminuiu.
O domínio do protecionismo e da intervenção estatal resultou em uma espécie de fragmentação da economia global em sistemas e zonas de preferência que eram isolados uns dos outros em maior ou menor grau. A Interwar Germany acessou recursos energéticos e matérias-primas no leste e sudeste da Europa para fortalecer sua indústria, mas negligenciou sua indústria de bens de consumo. Em geral, o período entre guerras na Europa foi caracterizado pela desintegração econômica e social, e a "casa européia" teve que ser reconstruída a partir de suas fundações após a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Isso envolveu a diminuição da quantidade de dinheiro em circulação, o estabelecimento de ordem monetária e a adequação dos países europeus ao mercado global. Graças em grande parte ao Plano Marshall (Programa de Recuperação da Europa), estes objetivos foram amplamente alcançados e um impressionante crescimento econômico liderado pelas exportações se seguiu. A OECE (Organização para a Cooperação Econômica Européia) forneceu uma base institucional eficaz para esse processo. Como resultado do Plano Schuman e dos esforços de conciliação a todos os níveis, a Alemanha, a França, os países do Benelux e a Itália conseguiram estabelecer uma base relativamente estável para a integração europeia. As tentativas cautelosas de influenciar o desenvolvimento industrial envolvido no Pacto do Carvão e do Aço 26 levaram à fundação da Comunidade Econômica Européia (CEE) em 1957. No ano seguinte, o Parlamento Europeu foi estabelecido em Estrasburgo com Robert Schuman (1886 & # 8211 1963) [] como seu primeiro presidente. Os Tratados de Roma (25 de Março de 1957), nos quais a CEE se baseava, constituíam um primeiro grande passo no caminho para a integração política e económica europeia. Isso não apenas forneceu um forte estímulo à integração "interna", mas também construiu uma estrutura inicial para as relações externas.
Com uma participação de 20% de todas as importações e exportações globais, a União Européia é a maior potência comercial do século 21, seguida pelos EUA, China e Japão. Em 2010, os bens no valor de 15,238 bilhões de dólares foram exportados para todo o mundo (em 2009, foram 12,522 bilhões de dólares). Isso equivale a um crescimento de aproximadamente 21,7% em relação a 2009. Os principais exportadores foram a República Popular da China, os EUA, a Alemanha, o Japão e a Holanda. Esses cinco países juntos representaram 35,9% das exportações mundiais de bens. Em 2010, a China esteve no topo da lista das nações exportadoras mais fortes do mundo pela segunda vez, seguida pelos EUA e Alemanha. 28.
Europa e o mundo africano.
A descoberta e conquista da África, América e Leste da Índia no final da Idade Média e no início do período moderno tiveram efeitos duradouros nos territórios e regiões envolvidos. Durante o curso do século XV, Portugal & # 8211; localizado centralmente na conexão entre as duas zonas do Atlântico & # 8211; foi capaz de conquistar locais estratégicos ao longo da costa oeste da África e na região do Atlântico Africano, embora essas bases tenham sofrido graves reversões entre 1475 e 1480. 29 Na década de 1440, os portugueses expandiram seu comércio de escravos africanos na região costeira do Rio. de Oro, que agora podiam conduzir sem a ajuda de intermediários asiáticos e africanos. Esses assentamentos fortemente fortificados, como os da ilha de Arguim, na África Ocidental, e da cidade de Elmina, no atual Gana, não eram apenas centros do comércio de escravos, mas também serviam de base para o comércio de ouro, pimenta malagueta, marfim e outros bens comerciais.
Inicialmente, foram os marinheiros e capitães italianos que, a serviço de Portugal, exploraram as ilhas atlânticas ao norte da África. 30 Em 1312, Lanzarotto Malocello (ca. 1270 & # 8211; 1336), que veio da região ao redor de Gênova, descobriu as Ilhas Canárias. Lanzarote foi nomeado após ele. No início do século XV, os portugueses asseguraram mais cidades e ilhas da região, por exemplo, Ceuta em 1415, Madeira em 1418, Açores em 1427 e Cabo Bojador no continente africano. Posteriormente, outras bases ao longo da costa oeste da África foram adicionadas, progredindo de norte a sul: Cabo Branco em 1441, Cabo Verde em 1444 e a foz do rio Gâmbia em 1446. Em 1456, o italiano Alvise Cadamosto (1432 & # 8211; 1488), que estava a serviço de Henrique, o Navegador (1394 & # 8211; 1460), reivindicou as Ilhas de Cabo Verde para Portugal. 31 A Serra Leoa foi reivindicada em 1460 e o Forte S-227 de Jorge da Mina foi construído dois anos depois. Aqui, os portugueses começaram a comerciar extensivamente, adquirindo ouro africano em troca de tecido tinto vermelho e azul, lenços de cabeça, coral da Europa, braçadeiras de latão da Alemanha e vinho branco português. Neste comércio, como no comércio de escravos, mexilhões amarelos e vermelhos das Canárias eram usados ​​como dinheiro. 32
No início do período moderno, a África tornou-se a região preferida de operação das empresas comerciais privilegiadas. Inglaterra, França, Holanda, Suíça e vários outros países europeus entregaram produtos manufaturados de vidro, metal e têxteis, bem como armas e álcool para a África em troca de escravos, provisões, ouro, etc. era muitas vezes apenas uma perna do chamado comércio triangular entre a Europa, a África e a América. Esse sistema de comércio permaneceu dominante do século XVII ao início do século XIX, quando a proibição cada vez mais generalizada do comércio de escravos mudou o foco do comércio na África. Most of the African states became dependent on European colonial powers who reduced them to the status of suppliers of raw materials and comprehensively exploited them. Similar to South America, monocultures emerged in Africa which were heavily dependent on the weather conditions and the harvest cycle. Water shortages, famines, low per capita incomes and low literacy levels remain the consequences of African "modernity" up to the present. In many African states, the economic dominance of Western states persists up to the present, often referred to as neo-colonialism in the literature. The continuing demand for raw materials on the global market could greatly improve growth and the balance of trade in the resource-rich states of Africa if the resulting export surpluses were invested in the respective countries and found their way into the pockets of consumers there. In general, large differences in per capita incomes exist between the individual African states. The economic reality of Africa is too complex to be described solely in terms of dependency theories or the world system approach. 33
Europe, the Orient and Asia.
Leaving aside classical antuity, territorial expansion from Europe towards Asia can be traced back to the period of the crusades, which lasted from the end of the 11th to the 13th century. Along the routes followed by the crusaders to southeastern Europe, across the Balkans and to the Levant, an impressive infrastructure emerged to meet the weaponry and provisioning needs of a few hundred thousand crusading knights and pilgrims bound for Jerusalem . Many of these provisioning stations were subsequently used by Italian and other European merchants for the transportation of goods to and from the Middle East and the Levant. Venice proved to be particularly well-placed geographically to benefit from this trade. It became the focal point for the exchange of goods and information between Asia and Europe, 34 and a "model" for the subsequent trade networks of the colonial powers of Portugal, the Netherlands and Britain. 35 The golden age of the lagoon city reached a climax after the conquest of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade (1199–1204). It is no coincidence that it was Venetian merchants like Niccolò, Maffeo and Marco Polo who helped to establish the trade in goods with the Chinese Empire and even established diplomatic relations with the court of Kublai Khan (1215–1295). In doing so, they utilized existing routes such as the Silk Road , an important axis of medieval "global trade" which grew in importance in the late 13th and 14th centuries. This had a profound effect not only on the material culture of Europe, but also on Europeans' idea of Asia. In the Battle of Curzola in 1298, Marco Polo was taken into Genoese captivity, and he described his journey to the writer Rusticiano da Pisa while in prison. Through the writings of the latter, some details of Polo's experiences in China entered the mosaic of images, facts and beliefs which Europeans associated with China. In addition to members of the Polo family, other contemporaries also set out for Central Asia, such as the Flanders native Wilhelm von Rubruk (ca. 1210–1270) who set out in May 1253. Many were clergymen, such as the Franciscan Johannes von Montecorvino (1247–1328) who visited India and reported on spices such as pepper and cinnamon, and on the culinary habits of the Indians. Odorico da Pordenone (ca. 1286–1331) from Udine , who was also a Franciscan monk, travelled in 1314/1315 via Ceylon , Java , Singapore and southern China to Peking , and he reported on his experiences, both ordinary and extraordinary. More than 110 of his manuscripts have survived, and his influence has been significant. 36
Whereas the Polos had travelled to Asia primarily by land, sea voyages to Asia increased from 1488 onward when Bartholomeu Diaz (ca. 1450–1500) from Portugal became the first to sail around the Cape of Good Hope . The establishment of the Portuguese empire in India made European-Asian relationships more permanent and secure. In some cases, Italian sea captains and southern German capital participated in these voyages. 37 In the context of this double expansion in the Atlantic region and in the Far East, Lisbon became increasingly central and pivotal in global trade. It was no coincidence that many overseas expeditions by important explorers began in the Portuguese capital.
The first expeditions to Asia during and after the discovery of the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope and into the Indian Ocean witnessed conspicuous efforts on the part of southern, central and western European merchants and consortia to promote their interests in the east by means of agents. For example, wealthy Nuremberg and Augsburg merchants, and Dutchmen participated in the first voyages to India. Following the punctual pattern established in Africa, the Portuguese began to fortify ports and towns in strategically important places, in order to make them impervious to attacks. The cities of Calicut and Goa are examples on the Indian west coast. Development in the early modern period was dominated by the privileged trading companies of the Dutch and the British, but also of smaller states such as Denmark . 38.
From the 17th century, the Netherlands played a leading role in trade between Europe and the rest of the world, particularly trade with Asia. In the 18th century, Great Britain dominated the Asian markets, though its focus was on India instead of Indonesia and Southeast Asia . The British East India Company, founded in 1600, and the Dutch East India Company , founded in 1602, dominated markets in the Indian Ocean and – to a lesser extent – in the South China Sea . Their power extended far beyond trade, and it resulted in a "golden age" in Holland and its main city, Amsterdam. 39
In the 18th and 19th centuries, parts of Asia were increasingly drawn into the process of European industrialization. India in particular, as part of the Commonwealth, became an important source of raw materials (particularly cotton) as well as food and stimulants (particularly tea). The period of industrialization and of the rise of the middle class in Europe would not have been possible without these supplies and the intensification of exchange with Asia. The building of railways – a European innovation – began in the 19th century in Turkey , India, Japan and China, with lasting consequences for the territorialisation of economics and trade, and it provided the basis for further trade. The telegraph line between Calcutta and London, which was constructed by Siemens and opened in 1870, gave an important new stimulus to trade and the exchange of information between Europe and Asia. In all regions of Asia, enclaves and cities remained in European ownership until relatively recently, as in the case of Hong Kong which the British only relinquished in 1997.
America, the Pacific and Asia.
If one defines interdependence as a regular, planned, systematic, on-going and reciprocal exchange of information and goods, then one can observe the beginning of American-Asian relations in 1519, at which time the Manila fleets began to sail regularly from Acapulco (Mexico) to Indonesia, or more specifically to the port city and trading centre of Manila on the Philippines . They brought precious metals, particularly silver, from Central America to Asia and usually transported spices, silks, porcelain and jewels back. Pearls from the islands of Cubagua and Margarita off the coast of Venezuela were also traded overseas. In the 16th century, this trade prompted southern German merchants such as Christoph Herwart (1464–1529) to get involved in trade with India. 40.
Europe Meets Australia in the 17th Century.
It can be assumed that the discovery of the Cape York Peninsula by the Dutchman Willem Jansz (ca. 1570–1630) in 1606 was one of the first instances of economic contact between Europe and Australia. A decade later, Dirk Hartog (1580–1621) reached the west coast of Australia. During the course of the 17th century, Willem de Vlamingh (1640–1698) and William Dampier (1651–1715) "discovered" other parts of the Australian continent, thereby facilitating the more concentrated exploration and mapping of Australia. From a European perspective, Australia did not play a significant role in trade, though there was some British foreign investment in Australia before the First World War. This was focused primarily on the building and financing of infrastructure projects (railways, harbours, public buildings, etc.). Conversely, Australian wool and mutton were exported to Europe. 41.
Europe, the Atlantic and America.
The beginning of relatively regular economic relations between Europe and America occurred in the 16th century. The initial contact with America which Vikings under Erik the Red (950–ca. 1005) established around 1000 BC cannot be described as a lasting exchange; neither can such exchange be said to have existed in the first two or three decades after America was rediscovered by the Genoese sailor Christopher Columbus (1451–1506). 42.
Trade between the Old World and the New World constantly experienced fluctuations which were caused by by economic growth and developments such as the discovery, mining and transportation of precious metals. This was true in particular of silver and gold from South America and Central America, and later from North America. The supply of coin metal to European states from overseas affected the currency stability, luidity, monetary independence, and ultimately the profitability of early modern capital markets. However, due to insufficient domestic production, Spain was constantly dependent on imports from Asia, and a considerable portion of the precious metals imported from South America was transferred to Asia via Cádiz and Seville as payment. Consequently, the quantity of precious metals which was used to mint coins in Spain and Portugal should not be overestimated. The inflationary effect of imported precious metals was therefore less significant than has been assumed. 43.
Around the beginning of the 16th century, Portugal's double expansion continued with its turning westward and commencing to colonize Brazil . Impressive colonial cities came into being on the coast, such as Salvador do Bahia , the first capital city of Brazil. The eastern part of South America had been granted to the Portuguese by Pope Alexander VI (1492–1503) in the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) . Around 1500, Pedro Alvarez Cabral (ca. 1468–1520) claimed mainland Brazil for Portugal, and expeditions during the course of the 16th century, such as those by Martim Afonso de Sousa (1500–1564), explored the Brazilian interior. During this time, several groups of Portuguese Jesuits founded towns and the earliest sugar cane plantations in Brazil. One such sugar mill was acquired by the Schetz company of Antwerp in 1540. 44 Sugar production in Brazil was able to increase vastly in scale because of the use of African slaves, thereby paving the way for the basic forms of tropical agricultural production which were to become the predominant forms in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean , as well as in the southern part of North America. Brazil played a large role in supplying Europe with inexpensive sugar in the early modern period due to big increases in productivity in the cultivation of sugar cane which brought down the price of sugar. A similar development occurred in the case of maize, cocoa, coffee, tobacco and cotton.
In the second third of the 16th century, transatlantic relations intensified, due in part to the discovery of precious metals in South America. During the course of the discovery of the American continent, not only did people of different ethnic backgrounds encounter one another, the material culture was also greatly enriched, for example by the arrival of previously unknown plants, animals and goods in Europe. Medieval Europe had no knowledge of cocoa and, consequently, of chocolate. Some present-day dietary staples such as maize and the potato, which – like tapioca and nasturtium – are good sources of carbohydrates, were previously unknown in Europe also. Equally new to Europeans were sugar-rich plants such as sugar maple and protein-rich legumes such as beans. Other plants such as peanuts provided oil and fat. New vegetable types such as tomatoes, peppers and pumpkins, and nuts and fruits from avocados and pineapples to guavas and papayas appeared on European tables. Europe became acquainted with intoxicants such as the products of the maté tree and the coca bush. Spices such as vanilla, allspice and chili contributed to the refinement of European culinary tastes. Tobacco was also cultivated in Europe for the first time in the early modern period. It is beyond question that the exchange of new types of food and stimulants has had an effect on patterns of behaviour – and even on architecture – in the modern period. Smoking rooms or gentlemen's rooms containing pipe stands, ashtrays, matches and similar utensils were a given in 18th-century and 19th-century villas. Coffee houses were often popular meeting places for artists and literati, and were consequently much-frequented places for meeting and communication which had a considerable effect on the culture of large European cities.
New types of wood, such as rare pine species and mahogany, appeared in the sitting rooms of affluent Europeans. Quebracho trees and various species of mangrove provided tannic acid. Rubber trees and sweet potato trees provided rubber, while the wax palm, the carnauba palm and the jojoba provided wax. The variety of dyes available was also increased by access to tropical plants, ranging from the brazil wood to the redwood, the logwood, the yellowwood, and indigo, which began to replace woad in Europe. The New World was also a source of numerous plants which provided insecticides, such as barbasco roots, the bitterwood, and the cashew nut; even tobacco falls into this category. Today "American" plants are even used as fuel sources, as experiments with tapioca, maize and species of copaiba demonstrate. 45.
Conversely, Europe enriched the American continent by the introduction of new animal and plant species, as well as new inventions, cultivation technues and ideas. These ranged from horses, cattle, donkeys and hens to honeybees and silkworms, and from new types of cereals such as barley to apples, apricots, almonds, various types of cabbage, carrots, aubergines, flax and garlic. Europeans also introduced a vast array of weapons and craft tools, as well as institutional innovations such as Roman law, which was established in many states of North and South America. There were also innovations such as the amalgamation process for extracting silver and gold from ores using mercury, or book printing, which accelerated and intensified the transfer of information and knowledge from the Old World to the New World.
To summarize, the encounter between the material and intellectual cultures of Europe and America resulted in enormous mutual enrichment and inspiration. 46 However, it also had negative effects, such as the transfer of diseases in both directions. Many more indigenous Americans died as a result of "European" diseases than died in violent confrontations during the course of the Conquista . Conversely, European travellers contracted "American" illnesses which had not existed in medieval Europe.
The Netherlands, England, France, and other European countries (Denmark, Sweden , Austria, Prussia , Switzerland, etc.) sought to gain access to trade in Asia, Africa and America by means of privileged companies. In the 17th and 18th centuries, this often took the form of the so-called triangular trade, i. e., participation in trade with Africa, America and the Caribbean, and the rest of Europe, African trade being largely synonymous with slave trading. Slaves were bought in exchange for European manufactured goods and subsequently transported to the large estates of the West Indies and America on special slave ships. 47 In the early modern period, 10 to 12 million Africans were taken in this way to the New World, from where colonial produce was transported to Europe. Privileged European trading companies were also employed in Atlantic trade, such as the Royal African Company and the Hudson's Bay Company, the Dutch West India Company and corresponding French companies.
The expanding European settlements in America required a growing number of labourers for the work on plantations and other possessions. As a result, the triangular trade persisted until the abolition movement of the 19th century. Denmark and Great Britain abolished slavery in 1807, followed by the USA in 1808, and Holland and France in 1814. In addition to the role played by the American and French revolutions in promoting freedom and human rights, economic interests played a decisive role in this process. New economic systems which emerged as a result of the industrial revolutions began to replace old mercantilist forms. The emerging polypolistic variety of markets was accompanied by the intensification of market formation and of competition. An economic transformation occurred, which introduced new institutional forms, a liberal economic and social order, and a radical integration of world markets. Subsequently, global exports grew as a proportion of the world social product from approximately 1% in 1825 to approximately 8% in 1900, and finally to approximately 16% in 2000. The global economy has multiplied by 44 since 1820, and global trade has grown in volume by a factor of 600 in the same period.
Up to the First World War, Western Europe undoubtedly contributed most to the world gross social product. In 1913, it accounted for 906 billion international dollars (of a total of 1990 billion), which equates to 33.5% of the World Gross Domestic Product (GDP). By 1950, this percentage declined to 26.3%, and by 1998 to 20.6%. 48 While Europe's trade with territories in the rest of the world grew in absolute terms, it became less important in relative terms since trade relations between the industrialized countries grew disproportionately quickly in significance.
Rolf Walter , Jena.
Literatura.
Ambrosius, Gerold / Hubbard, William H.: Sozial - und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Europas im 20. Jahrhundert, Munich 1986.
Ankenbauer, Norbert: "das ich mochte meer newer dyng erfaren": Die Versprachlichung des Neuen in den Paesi novamente retrovati (Vicenza, 1507) und in ihrer deutschen Übersetzung (Nürnberg, 1508), Berlin 2010.
Ball, J. N.: Merchants and Merchandise: The Expansion of Trade in Europe 1500–1630, London 1977.
Bayly, Christopher A.: The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons, Oxford 2004.
Behringer, Wolfgang: Fugger und Taxis: Der Anteil Augsburger Kaufleute an der Entstehung des europäischen Kommunikationssystems, in: Johannes Burkhardt et. al.: Augsburger Handelshäuser im Wandel des historischen Urteils, Berlin 1986, pp. 241–248.
Blaich, Fritz: Die Epoche des Merkantilismus, Wiesbaden 1973.
Blockmans, Wim: Geschichte der Macht in Europa: Völker, Staaten, Märkte, Frankfurt am Main 1998.
Borries, Bodo von: Deutschlands Außenhandel 1836–1856: Eine statistische Untersuchung zur Frühindustrialisierung, Stuttgart 1970.
Braudel, Fernand: Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe siècle: vol. 2: Les Jeux de l'échange, Paris 1986.
Braudel, Fernand: Sozialgeschichte des 15.–18. Jahrhunderts, vol. 3: Aufbruch zur Weltwirtschaft, Munich 1990.
Bräunlein, Peter J.: Martin Behaim: Legende und Wirklichkeit eines berühmten Nürnbergers, Bamberg 1992.
Burk, Kathleen: Money and Power: The Shift from Great Britain to the United States, in: Youssef Cassis (ed.): Finance and Financiers in European History 1880–1960, Cambridge 1992, pp. 359–369.
Cameron, Rondo: Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft, vol. 1: Vom Paläolithikum bis zur Industrialisierung; vol. 2: Von der Industrialisierung bis zur Gegenwart, Stuttgart 1991–1992.
Cassandro, Michele: L'irradiazione economica fiorentina nell'Italia meridoniale tra Medioevo e Rinascimento, in: Ilaria Zilli (ed.): Fra spazio e tempo: Studi in onore di Luigi De Rosa, Naples 1995, vol. I, pp. 191–221.
Crosby, Alfred W.: The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492, Westport, CT 1972.
Degn, Christian: Die Schimmelmanns im atlantischen Dreieckshandel: Gewinn und Gewissen, Neumünster, 3rd edition, 2000.
Diwald, Hellmut: Der Kampf um die Weltmeere, Munich 1980.
Erhard, Andreas / Ramminger, Eva: Die Meerfahrt: Balthasar Springers Reise zur Pfefferküste, Innsbruck 1998.
Ewald, Ursula: Pflanzen Iberoamerikas und ihre Bedeutung für Europa: Überlegungen aus geographischer Sicht, in: Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas, 32 (1995), pp. 33–55.
Fäßler, Peter E.: Globalisierung: Ein historisches Kompendium, Cologne et al. 2007.
Fremdling, Rainer: Technologischer Wandel und internationaler Handel im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert: Die Eisenindustrien in Großbritannien, Belgien, Frankreich und Deutschland, Berlin 1986.
Gerschenkron, Alexander: Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Cambridge, MA 1968.
Gerschenkron, Alexander: Europe in the Russian Mirror: Four Lectures in Economic History, London 1970.
Glamann, Kristof: Der europäische Handel 1500–1750, in: Carlo Maria Cipolla / Knut Borchardt: Europäische Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Stuttgart et al. 1983, vol. 2: Sechzehntes und siebzehntes Jahrhundert, pp. 271–333.
Grabas, Margrit: Konjunktur und Wachstum in Deutschland von 1895 bis 1914, Berlin 1992 (Schriften zur Wirtschafts - und Sozialgeschichte 39).
Gramulla, Gertrud Susanna: Handelsbeziehungen Kölner Kaufleute zwischen 1500 und 1650, Cologne 1972 (Forschungen zur internationalen Sozial - und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 4).
Hamilton, Earl J.: American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501–1650, Cambridge, MA 1934 (Harvard Economic Studies 43).
Hardach, Gerd: Der Erste Weltkrieg, Munich 1977.
Hendrich, Yvonne: Valentin Fernandes: Ein deutscher Buchdrucker in Portugal um die Wende vom 15. zum 16. Jahrhundert und sein Umkreis, Frankfurt am Main 2007 (Mainzer Studien zur neueren Geschichte 21).
Hogendorn, Jan. S. / Johnson, Marion: The Shell Money of the Slave Trade, Cambridge 1986.
Israel, Jonathan J.: Dutch Primacy in World Trade 1585–1740, Oxford 1989.
Jeannin, Pierre: Les marchands au XVIe siècle, Paris 1957.
Kalus, Maximilian: Pfeffer – Kupfer – Nachrichten: Kaufmannsnetzwerke und Handelsstrukturen im europäisch-asiatischen Handel am Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts, Augsburg 2010 (Materialien zur Geschichte der Fugger 6).
Kellenbenz, Hermann: Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 2 vols., Munich 1977–1981.
Kellenbenz, Hermann: Dreimal Lateinamerika, Munich 1990.
Kellenbenz, Hermann: Die Fugger in Spanien und Portugal bis 1560: Ein Großunternehmen des 16. Jahrhunderts, 2 vols., Munich 1990.
Kellenbenz, Hermann (ed.): Handbuch der Europäischen Wirtschafts - und Sozialgeschichte, Stuttgart 1986, vol. 3: Europäische Wirtschafts - und Sozialgeschichte vom ausgehenden Mittelalter bis zur Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts.
Kellenbenz, Hermann: Handelsgeschichte, in: Willi Albers et al. (eds.): Handwörterbuch der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, 1981, vol. 3, pp. 762–784.
Kellenbenz, Hermann: Der Merkantilismus und die soziale Mobilität in Europa, Wiesbaden 1965.
Kellenbenz, Hermann: Neues zum oberdeutschen Ostindienhandel, insbesondere der Herwart in der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts, in: Forschungen zur schwäbischen Geschichte, Sigmaringen 1991 (Veröffentlichungen der Schwäbischen Forschungsgemeinschaft Reihe 7, Augsburger Beiträge zur Landesgeschichte Bayerisch-Schwabens 4), pp. 81–96.
Kellenbenz, Hermann: The Rise of the European Economy: An Economic History of Continental Europe from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century, London 1976.
Kellenbenz, Hermann: Die Wiege der Moderne: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Europas 1350–1650, Stuttgart 1991.
Kellenbenz, Hermann / Walter, Rolf (eds.): Oberdeutsche Kaufleute in Sevilla und Cádiz (1525–1560): Eine Edition von Notariatsakten aus den dortigen Archiven, Stuttgart 2001 (Deutsche Handelsakten des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit XXI).
Kenwood, Albert George / Lougheed, Alan Leslie: The Growth of the International Economy, London et al. 1992.
Kindleberger, Charles P.: Economic Response: Comparative Studies in Trade, Finance and Growth, Cambridge, MA et al. 1978
Klein, Herbert S.: The Atlantic Slave Trade, Cambridge 1999 (New Approaches to the Americas 3).
Knabe, Wolfgang: Auf den Spuren der ersten deutschen Kaufleute in Indien: Forschungsexpedition mit der Mercator entlang der Westküste und zu den Aminen, Anhausen 1993.
Kraus, Michael / meyer, Hans: Novos Mundos – Neue Welten: Portugal und das Zeitalter der Entdeckungen, Berlin 2007 (Ausstellungskatalog des Deutschen Historischen Museums Berlin).
Kriedte, Peter: Spätfeudalismus und Handelskapital: Grundlinien der europäischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte vom 16. bis zu Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts, Göttingen 1980.
Krieger, Martin: Kaufleute, Seeräuber und Diplomaten: Der dänische Handel auf dem Indischen Ozean (1620–1868), Cologne et al. 1998 (Wirtschafts - und Sozialhistorische Studien 8).
Kutz, Martin: Deutschlands Außenhandel von der Französischen Revolution bis zur Gründung des Zollvereins, Wiesbaden 1974 (Beihefte der Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial - und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 61).
Landes, David S.: Der entfesselte Prometheus: Technologischer Wandel und industrielle Entwicklung in Westeuropa von 1750 bis zur Gegenwart, Cologne 1973.
Landes, David S.: Wohlstand und Armut der Nationen: Warum die einen reich und die anderen arm sind, Berlin 1999.
Lopez, Roberto S.: The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages 950–1350, Cambridge 1976.
Maddalena, Aldo de: La ricchezza dell'Europa: Indagini sull'antico regime e sulla modernità, Milan 1992.
Maddison, Angus: The World Economy: A Millenial Perspective, Paris 2001.
Martin, John / Romano, Dennis (eds.): Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-State 1297–1797, Baltimore, MD et al. 2000.
Maué, Hermann (ed.): Quasi Centrum Europae, Nuremberg 2002 (Anzeiger des Germanischen Nationalmuseums 2002), pp. 74–85.
Melis, Federigo: Il commercio transatlantico di una compagnia fiorentina stabilita a Siviglia a pochi anni dale imprese di Cortés e Pizarro, in: Estudios del V Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragón (Zaragoza 1952), Saragossa 1954, vol. III, pp. 131–206.
Mitterauer, Michael: Warum Europa? Mittelalterliche Grundlagen eines Sonderwegs, Munich 2003.
Mitchell, Brian R.: International Historical Statistics: Europe: 1750–1993, 4th edition, New York, NY 1998.
Nagel, Jürgen G.: Abenteuer Fernhandel: Die Ostindienkompanien, Darmstadt 2007.
North, Douglass C.: Ocean Freight Rates and Economic Development 1750–1913, in: Journal of Economic History 18, 1958, pp. 537–555.
North, Douglass C.: Structure and Change in Economic History, New York, NY 1981.
North, Douglass C.: Theorie des institutionellen Wandels: Eine neue Sicht der Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Tübingen 1988.
North, Michael: Das Goldene Zeitalter: Kunst und Kommerz in der niederländischen Malerei des 17. Jahrhunderts, 2nd edition, Cologne et al. 2001.
North, Michael (ed.): westeuropa in der Weltwirtschaft, Stuttgart 1993 (Beiträge zur Wirtschafts - und Sozialgeschichte 54).
Osterhammel, Jürgen / Petersson, Niels P.: Geschichte der Globalisierung: Dimensionen, Prozesse, Epochen, Munich 2003.
Otte, Enrue: Von Bankiers und Kaufleuten, Räten, Reedern und Piraten, Hintermännern und Strohmännern, Stuttgart 2004 (Studien zur modernen Geschichte 58).
Pamuk, Sevket: The man Empire and European Capitalism, Trade, Investment and Production, Cambridge 1997.
Pieper, Renate: Die Preisrevolution in Spanien (1500–1640), Stuttgart 1985.
Pieper, Renate / Schmidt, Peer (eds.): Latin America and the Atlantic World: Essays in Honor of Horst Pietschmann, Cologne at al. 2005 (Lateinamerikanische Forschungen 33).
Pinder, John: Europa in der Weltwirtschaft 1920–1970, in: Carlo Maria Cipolla / Knut Borchardt: Europäische Wirtschaftsgeschichte, vol. 5: Die europäischen Volkswirtschaften im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert, Stuttgart et al. 1986, pp. 377–411.
Rapp, Richard T.: The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony: International Trade Rivalry and the Commercial Revolution, in: Journal of Economic History 35 (1975), pp. 499–525.
Reichert, Folker E.: Begegnungen mit China: Die Entdeckung Ostasiens im Mittelalter, Sigmaringen 1992.
Reichert, Folker E.: Erfahrung der Welt: Reisen und Kulturbegegnung im späten Mittelalter, Stuttgart 2001.
Reinhard, Wolfgang: Geschichte der europäischen Expansion, 4 vols., Stuttgart et al. 1983–1990.
Reininghaus, Wilfried (ed.): Wanderhandel in Europa: Beiträge zur wissenschaftlichen Tagung in Ibbenbüren, Mettingen, Recke und Hopsten vom 9.–11. Oktober 1992, Hagen 1993.
Roover, Raymond de: Business, Banking and Economic Thought in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europa: Selected Studies of Raymond de Roover, ed. by Julius Kirshner, Chicago, IL 1974.
Rostow, Walt Whitman: The World Economy: History & Prospect, Basingstoke et al. 1978
Scammell, Geoffrey V.: The World Encompassed: The First European Maritime Empires c. 800–1650, London et al. 1981.
Schnurmann, Claudia: Europa trifft Amerika: Atlantische Wirtschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit 1492–1783, Frankfurt am Main 1998.
Schnurmann, Claudia: Atlantische Welten: Engländer und Niederländer im amerikanisch-atlantischen Raum 1648–1713, Cologne et al. 1998.
Teixeira da Mota, Avelino: Der portugiesische Seehandel in Westafrika im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklung des überregionalen Handelsverkehrs, Cologne 1969.
Tracy, James D. (ed.): The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750, Cambridge et al. 1990.
Van der Wee, Herman: Structural Changes in European Long-Distance Trade and Particularly in the Re-Export Trade from South to North 1350–1750, in: James D. Tracy (ed.): The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750, Cambridge et al. 1990, pp. 14–33.
Van der Wee, Herman: The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy, 3 vols., Louvain 1963.
Van der Wee, Herman / Aerts, Erik: De economische ontwikkeling van Europa: 950–1950, 10th edition, Louvain 1994.
Verlinden, Charles: Atlantischer Raum und Indische-Ozean-Zone in kolonialgeschichtlicher Perspektive, Nuremberg 1982 (Vorträge zur Wirtschafts - und Überseegeschichte 10).
Wallerstein, Immanuel: The Modern World System, vol. 1: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century, New York, NY 1974; vol. 2: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy 1600–1750, New York, NY et al. 1980; vol. 3: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World Economy 1730–1840, San Diego, CA 1988.
Walter, Rolf: Commerz, Contrebande und Continentalsystem: Die Wirtschaft Südwestdeutschlands in napoleonischer Zeit, in: Württembergisches Landesmuseum Stuttgart (ed.): Baden und Württemberg im Zeitalter Napoleons, Stuttgart 1987, vol. 2: Aufsätze.
Walter, Rolf: Einführung in die Wirtschafts - und Sozialgeschichte, Cologne et al. 2008.
Walter, Rolf: Einleitung: Oberdeutsche Kaufleute und Genuesen in Sevilla und Cádiz (1525–1560), in: Hermann Kellenbenz / Rolf Walter (eds.): Oberdeutsche Kaufleute in Sevilla und Cádiz (1525–1560): Eine Edition von Notariatsakten aus den dortigen Archiven, Stuttgart 2001 (Deutsche Handelsakten des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit XXI). pp. 11–64.
Walter, Rolf: Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft: Eine Einführung, Cologne et al. 2006.
Walter, Rolf (ed.): Globalisierung in der Geschichte, Stuttgart 2011 (VSWG-Beihefte 214).
Walter, Rolf: Die Welser und ihre Partner im 'World Wide Web' der Frühen Neuzeit, in: Angelika Westermann / Stefanie von Welser (eds.): Neunhofer Dialog I: Einblicke in die Geschichte des Handelshauses Welser, St. Katharinen 2009, pp. 11–27.
Walter, Rolf: Welthandel und Kapitalismus, in: Brockhaus Weltgeschichte, Leipzig et al. 1998, vol. 4: Wege in die Moderne (1650–1850), pp. 308–375.
Walter, Rolf: Wirtschaftsgeschichte: Vom Merkantilismus bis zur Gegenwart, 5th edition, Cologne et al. 2011
Weber, Klaus: Deutsche Kaufleute im Atlantikhandel 1680–1830: Unternehmen und Familien in Hamburg, Cádiz und Bordeaux, Munich 2004.
Weindl, Andrea: Wer kleidet die Welt? Globale Märkte und merkantile Kräfte in der europäischen Politik der Frühen Neuzeit, Mainz 2007 (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, Abteilung für Universalgeschichte 211).
Wiesflecker, Hermann: Neue Beiträge zu Balthasar Sprengers Meerfahrt nach "Groß-India", in: Klaus Brandstätter / Julia Hörmann (eds.): Tirol – Österreich – Italien: Festschrift für Josef Riedmann zum 65. Geburtstag, Innsbruck 2005 (Schlern-Schriften 330), pp. 647–660.
Woodruff, William: Impact of Western Man: A Study of Europe's Role in the World Economy 1750–1960, London et al. 1966
World Trade Organization (ed.): International Trade Statistics, Geneva 2011, online: wto/statistics [26/03/2012].
Yates, P. Lamartine: Forty Years of Foreign Trade, London 1959.
Zorn, Wolfgang: Verdichtung und Beschleunigung des Verkehrs als Beitrag zur Entwicklung der "modernen Welt", in: Reinhart Koselleck (ed.): Studien zum Beginn der modernen Welt, Stuttgart 1977, pp. 115–137.
^ Glamann, Der europäische Handel 1983, pp. 271–333, here: 271. ^ Walter, Globalisierung 2011, pp. 7ff.; also contains the term "proto-globalization". ^ Kellenbenz, Handbuch Europäische Wirtschafts - und Sozialgeschichte 1986, vol. 3. ^ Cameron, Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft 1992, vol. 2, pp. 15ff., 181ff. ^ See the following works: Melis, Il comercio transatlantico 1954; de Maddalena, La ricchezza dell'Europa 1992; de Roover, Business 1974 und Cassandro, L'irradiazione economica fiorentina 1995. ^ See: Lopez, The Commercial Revolution 1976; Rapp, Unmaking 1975. ^ Blockmans, Macht 1998, p. 37. ^ Behringer, Fugger und Taxis 1986, pp. 242f. ^ Fremdling, Technologischer Wandel 1986, passim. ^ Burk, Money and Power 1992, p. 359. ^ Pinder, Europa in der Weltwirtschaft 1986, pp. 377f., 382. ^ ibid., p. 386. ^ Walter, Globalisierung 2011, p. 9. ^ Reichert, Begegnungen 1992. ^ Diwald, Weltmeere 1980, pp. 269 ff. and passim; Scammell, The World Encompassed 1981. ^ Van der Wee / Aerts, De economische ontwikkeling van Europa 1994, pp. 167f. ^ Braudel, Civilisation matérielle, vol. 2, 1986. ^ Mieck, Handbuch EWSG, vol. 4, 1993; Bayly, Birth 2004; Walter, Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2011, pp. 74ff. ^ Walter, Commerz 1987, pp. 193–218, here: 195f. ^ Kutz, Außenhandel 1974, passim. ^ Von Borries, Außenhandel 1970, pp. 82ff. and passim. ^ See: Gerschenkron, Backwardness 1968. ^ See: Fremdling, Wirtschaftswachstum 1985; Grabas, Konjunktur 1992. ^ See: Fremdling / O'Brian 1983. ^ Fäßler, Globalisierung 2007, p. 97. ^ Walter, Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2011, p. 262. ^ Europäische Union, Trade 2012. ^ WTO, International Trade Statistics 2011. ^ Kraus / meyer, Novos mundos 2007. ^ Verlinden, Atlantischer Raum und Indische-Ozean-Zone 1982. ^ Ankenbauer, "das ich mochte meer newer dyng erfaren" 2010, pp. 80ff. ^ Teixeira da Mota, Der portugiesische Seehandel 1969, pp. 7ff.; Hogendorn / Johnson, The Shell Money 1986. ^ Wallerstein, The Modern World System, vol. 1–3, 1974–1988, passim. ^ Martin / Romano, Venice Reconsidered 2000. ^ Van der Wee, Structural changes 1990, pp. 14–33. ^ Reichert, Erfahrung der Welt 2001, pp. 165ff., 203ff. and passim; idem, Begegnungen 1992, pp. 287–293. ^ Wiesflecker, Neue Beiträge 2005, pp. 647ff.; Kalus, Pfeffer 2010. ^ Nagel, Abenteuer Fernhandel 2007 (see the informative maps on pp. 33, 73, 103); Krieger, Kaufleute, Seeräuber und Diplomaten 1998. ^ Israel, Dutch Primacy 1989; North, Das Goldene Zeitalter 2001, pp. 19ff. and passim. ^ Kellenbenz, Ostindienhandel 1991; Walter, Oberdeutsche 2001, p. 42 and passim; Kalus, Pfeffer 2010, pp. 74, 106 and passim. ^ Cameron, Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft 1992, vol. 2, pp. 108f. ^ Walter, Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft 2006, pp. 103ff. ^ Pieper, Preisrevolution 1985, passim; Hamilton, American Treasure 1934. ^ Kellenbenz, Dreimal Lateinamerika 1990, p. 190. ^ Ewald, Pflanzen Iberoamerikas 1995, pp. 48ff. ^ Crosby, Columbian Exchange 1972, passim. ^ See: Degn, Die Schimmelmanns 2000; Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade 1999. ^ Maddison, The World Economy 2001, p. 261, Table B-18.
Dieser Text ist lizensiert unter This text is licensed under : CC by-nc-nd 3.0 Germany - Attribution, Noncommercial, No Derivative Works.
Übersetzt von: Translated by: Niall Williams.

Trading system in 13th century

Trade and business activity gave impetus to the process of geographic differentiation in Europe during the Middle Ages. Rural regions were predominantly agrarian in the 15th century. They served as producers of foodstuffs and suppliers of agricultural raw materials for commercial use. Only those regions with particularly favourable natural environments, such as the Nile Delta and Sicily, were integrated into the expanding trade network.
Cities engaged in trade, commerce and mining. Those that were not seats of ruling potentates depended on commerce as a means of enhancing their prospects for development. In addition to the mining areas in the uplands (such as Goslar in the Harz Mountains), other regions specialized in the production of cloth and textiles (south-eastern England, northern France, Flanders, southern France, northern Italy). Major trading centres and trade fair sites played an important role within the network of cities.
In the ancient world, European trade and commerce were concentrated primarily in the coastal areas of the Mediterranean region. After the last of the Crusades, cities such as Venice and Genoa assumed a dominant role in Mediterranean trade. They profited from their experience in trade in Oriental goods, from the increasing importance of banking and credit and, following the demise of major competitors (the Byzantine Empire), from their monopoly status. By virtue of their strength as sea powers, Venice and Genoa were able to pursue an often militant expansion policy.
Two focal points of trade and commerce had emerged in the North and Baltic Sea regions between the 9th and 11th centuries: Danish and Norwegian trade with Western Europe and Swedish trade with Asia Minor via Russia. The Hanseatic League was founded as a cooperative alliance of German merchants in the 11th century. It soon expanded its sphere of influence into the southern Baltic region through German colonization of territories to the east. Although the Hanseatic League differed from the Italian City Republics as a cooperative alliance of cities, its significance to trade was comparable. The most important trading hubs were Lьbeck and Bruges. During its years of bloom in the 13th and 14th centuries, the sphere of influence of the Hanseatic League encompassed more than 200 member cities and the entire region between London and Novgorod.
In spite of the risks it entailed, substantial profits could be gained through overseas trade. Earnings were reinvested in trading operations or land purchases and used to build a banking and credit sector. This promoted the rise of a money economy. New types of commercial enterprises were established. Their business activities were highly diverse and ranged from trade and banking to mining and commercial goods production (factories, publishing houses). Monopolies played an important role in the European economy (Medici: alum; Fugger: mercury). In the publishing sector, publishers supplied tools and material to paid home labourers and marketed the products themselves. Close relationships developed between major trading companies and local rulers (the awards of privileges, financial transactions). During a certain period, the Medicis were actually both major business players and political rulers at once.

h2g2 O Guia do Mochileiro das Galáxias: Earth Edition.
Encontre as entradas do h2g2:
Edição da Terra.
O sistema de comércio afro-eurasiano nos séculos XIII e XIV.
Criado em 4 de maio de 2006 | Atualizado em 4 de maio de 2006.
No período entre 1250 e 1350, a Afro-Eurásia experimentou um aumento na quantidade de comércio inter-regional. Havia numerosas razões para este aumento, assim como para o eventual declínio do sistema de negociação. A principal delas é a chegada dos mongóis como potência militar e o fim da Idade das Trevas na Europa. O sistema diminuiu por várias razões, incluindo o surto da peste bubônica, uma mudança climática conhecida como "pequena era do gelo" e turbulências políticas em vários países, especialmente na China.
Principais características da rede de negociação.
Afro-Eurásia.
A vasta quantidade de terra entre a Inglaterra no oeste e a China no leste, e a Rússia no norte e Java no sul é conhecida como um todo como Afro-Eurasia. Na Idade Média, até por volta de 1350, esta área era uma área de comércio movimentada, com caravanas de comércio e navios indo e vindo de oásis no deserto e portos no oceano, trocando mercadorias da China, Índia, Arábia, Mongólia, o Mediterrâneo, África e Europa.
Embora muitos bens percorressem enormes distâncias na Afro-Eurásia, poucos comerciantes atravessariam toda a região. Em vez disso, a área foi dividida em pequenos círculos sobrepostos. As mercadorias eram comercializadas em todas essas áreas menores e levadas para cidades onde dois ou mais círculos de comércio se sobrepunham. As mercadorias de uma área poderiam ser trocadas por moeda ou mercadorias da outra região, que eram vendidas em mercados na área ou levadas para o próximo círculo comercial. O viajante veneziano e comerciante Marco Polo mencionou como os bens eram levados de Cambay, na Índia, para Aden, e então "aqueles que vão para Aden são levados dali para Alexandria". Desta forma, as mercadorias poderiam ser comercializadas na maior parte do mundo conhecido, desde a Europa Ocidental Norte (Sul da Inglaterra, França e Alemanha) até o Sudeste Asiático (Sumatra, Java Ocidental, Malásia e Bornéu) sem nenhum comerciante passar anos viajando com os bens. As áreas dentro dos círculos de comércio eram relativamente independentes, mas as mercadorias não podiam ser comercializadas em todo o mundo sem cooperação e entendimento entre os comerciantes de diferentes raças, religiões e classes.
As mercadorias acabaram chegando aos mercados locais. O juiz e viajante de Tanger, Ibn Battuta, observou a extensão do comércio local no Egito. Ele notou que 'não há necessidade de um viajante no Nilo tomar quaisquer providências com ele', porque ele poderia 'descer no banco' para comprar provisões sempre que necessário. Ele viu uma "série contínua de bazares da cidade de Alexandria ao Cairo", uma vez que as cidades e aldeias "sucederam umas às outras ao longo de suas margens sem interrupção".
Marco Polo fez observações muito detalhadas de acordos comerciais em suas viagens. Ele observou as práticas comerciais na Índia, listando as exportações de pimenta e gengibre, além de canela em abundância e outras especiarias, turbit e cocos. Mercadores retornavam com "latão, que usavam como lastro, tecido de ouro e seda, remo, ouro, prata, cravos, nardo e outras especiarias que não são produzidas aqui".
A Arábia era quase literalmente o centro da rede de comércio nos séculos XIII e XIV. Bens foram trazidos para a Arábia de todos os cantos do mundo conhecido. Vários círculos de negociação se sobrepuseram, todos incorporando a Arábia. Uma chegou do sudoeste da Arábia ao noroeste da África (além do Nilo), uma do sudeste da Arábia ao oeste da Índia, uma do noroeste da Arábia à Itália e ao Mar Negro (incluindo todas as ilhas do Mediterrâneo e norte da África). incluindo o Cairo) e um do nordeste da Arábia ao Mar Cáspio (incluindo Bagdá e os rios Tigre e Eufrates).
A contribuição da Europa para a rede de comércio incluía cereais, madeira, metais preciosos, peles e couros, lã e produtos de lã e escravos. Eles receberam mercadorias "luxuosas" em troca, como seda, porcelana, especiarias e papel. Naturalmente, esses produtos eram muito caros quando eram comercializados em todo o mundo conhecido, mudando de mãos várias vezes no caminho. As mercadorias eram transportadas por camelo ou por mar, dependendo do peso / margem de lucro. Por exemplo, sedas e especiarias poderiam ser transportados em trens de camelo, pois eram leves e caros. No entanto, mercadorias maiores e mais pesadas, como o minério de ferro, eram transportadas em navios, apesar do aumento do custo e do perigo envolvidos em viajar pelo mar.
Antes de os mongóis conquistarem a China nos anos 1260/1270, o comércio não era generalizado. Apesar de ter a maior população e produção industrial, o comércio foi desencorajado. Em vez disso, um elaborado sistema de tributo fornecia mercadorias à China. Ibn Battuta descreveu uma transação que testemunhou durante sua estada em Déli, na qual o rei da China enviara ao sultão cem mamelucos e escravas, quinhentas peças de tecido aveludado, cinco maças de almíscar, cinco vestes adornadas com jóias, cinco bordados. treme e cinco espadas '. O sultão requereu o presente com 'cem cavalos puros e selados, cem escravos do sexo masculino, cem cantoras e danças hindus, mil e quinhentas peças de tecido, inigualáveis ​​em beleza, uma grande tenda, seis pavilhões, quatro candelabros ouro e seis em prata esmaltada, quatro bacias douradas com jarretes para combinar e seis bacias de prata, dez mantos de honra bordados do próprio guarda-roupa do sultão e dez bonés também usados ​​por ele, um deles incrustado de pérolas, dez quivers de um deles incrustados em pérolas, dez espadas, uma delas com bainha incrustada de pérolas, luvas bordadas em pérolas e quinze eunucos. Depois que os mongóis assumiram o controle da China, o sistema mundial se beneficiou do aumento do comércio.
Ascensão da Rede de Negociação.
Os mongóis.
O surgimento dos mongóis como uma grande potência no final do século 11 e início do século 12 levou à expansão da rede comercial para incluir a China e possibilitou o uso da rota terrestre através do sul da Rússia para a Ásia Ocidental, que anteriormente era muito perigosa. para caravanas comerciais regulares. Depois que os mongóis sob Gengis Khan e, mais tarde, Kubla Khan, conquistaram grande parte da Ásia, de Bagdá à China, o comércio foi incentivado e os comerciantes foram protegidos de ladrões e bandidos nas rotas comerciais. A invasão mongol da China foi benéfica para a rede mundial de comércio. Antes da invasão, a China era insular e o governo (sob a dinastia Song) não permitia que os chineses han deixassem as fronteiras da China para negociar. Sob a dinastia Yuan (Mongol), as tecnologias aumentaram e o comércio chinês foi adicionado à rede global. Sob a dinastia Yuan, a China se tornou um dos maiores centros comerciais do mundo. Marco Polo atribui isso à presença de Kubla Khan. Ele afirmou que "mercadorias mais preciosas e caras são importadas para o Khan-Balik do que para qualquer outra cidade do mundo". Ele também alegou que isso era "por conta do próprio Grande Khan, que mora aqui, e dos senhores e senhoras e da enorme multidão de donos de hotéis e outros residentes e visitantes que freqüentam as cortes aqui mantidas pelo Khan". Marco Polo estimava que "todos os dias mais de 1.000 carregamentos de seda chegam à cidade". A enorme base populacional e a tecnologia avançada da China aumentaram bastante a quantidade de comércio entre os séculos XIII e XIV.
Idade pós-escuridão na Europa.
A Europa se envolveu no sistema econômico mundial relativamente tarde, após o fim da Idade das Trevas, quando o comércio já estava bem estabelecido no Oriente Médio. A Europa só estava ligada à rede comercial através dos seus contactos no círculo comercial do Mediterrâneo, que se estendia desde Génova (norte da Itália) a oeste até ao Cairo a sudeste e a Caffa (no Mar Negro) a nordeste, ambos dos quais eram grandes centros comerciais. A Europa tomou conhecimento do comércio ocorrido no Oriente Médio durante as primeiras Cruzadas no final do século 11, quando os peregrinos ganharam um gosto pelos bens exóticos e luxuosos disponíveis na maioria dos centros urbanos do Oriente Médio. O contato com o resto do mundo encorajou a fabricação no noroeste da Europa, já que os bens eram feitos especificamente para o comércio de luxos "exóticos".
Declínio da Rede de Negociação.
O sistema comercial mundial sofreu uma queda drástica no século XIV. Esse declínio levou muitos historiadores a presumirem que quando a Europa emergiu como uma potência global depois de 1500, os vários impérios europeus foram o primeiro exemplo de uma rede comercial global. Mais recentemente, os historiadores perceberam que havia um sofisticado sistema comercial operando em toda a Afro-Eurásia antes de 1500, que caiu por várias razões, incluindo a mudança climática, a disseminação da peste bubônica e a agitação política.
Das Alterações Climáticas.
O clima sofreu uma mudança drástica por volta de 1300, com as temperaturas globais diminuindo no que veio a ser conhecido como uma "pequena era do gelo". As colheitas falharam em todo o mundo, e a Groenlândia teve que ser abandonada. Na década de 1330, o sistema de comércio global estava mostrando sinais de colapso iminente. Os bancos fracassaram na Itália, os portos de Gênova e Veneza pararam de se expandir, as dificuldades trabalhistas na Flandres 1 resultaram em tecidos de qualidade inferior sendo produzidos, e o número de guerras locais aumentou, assim como os custos de “proteção”.
Praga bubÔnica.
Ao mesmo tempo, o mundo lutava para lidar com um problema maior - a disseminação da peste bubônica. A peste originou-se provavelmente na Ásia Central e foi transportada por pulgas infectadas com cavaleiros mongóis para o centro-sul e norte da Ásia. Ele se espalhou para Caffa, no Mar Negro, quando os mongóis cercaram a cidade e foram levados para o Mediterrâneo com ratos a bordo de navios mercantes. Então, provavelmente, se espalhou ao longo das rotas comerciais. As áreas mais afetadas pela peste eram geralmente os centros comerciais, enquanto as áreas remotas e as rotas comerciais de importância limitada se saíam melhor.
Ming Rebellion.
Na China governada pelos mongóis, dificuldades econômicas e problemas políticos, e a rebelião Ming de 1368 levaram ao colapso da dinastia Yuan. A China, sob a Dinastia Ming ('brilhante'), retirou-se da rede de comércio global. A perda de um dos maiores círculos de comércio contribuiu para o declínio de todo o sistema.
O passado e o presente.
Compreender os eventos que levaram ao surgimento de uma rede global de comércio na Idade Média, bem como os eventos que levaram à sua queda, é crucial no mundo de hoje. Os eventos que ocorreram há séculos na Afro-Eurásia levaram diretamente ao desenvolvimento de sistemas em nosso mundo moderno. O passado não está isolado do presente; é integral na compreensão do presente e para ajudar a prever o curso futuro dos eventos humanos. Um dos maiores equívocos sobre o passado que veio à luz nas últimas décadas é a suposição eurocêntrica errônea de que a Europa sempre esteve à frente do resto do mundo cultural e economicamente. Uma melhor compreensão do Oriente Médio e da Ásia é extremamente pertinente na sociedade atual.
Leitura adicional
Ross E. Dunn, As Aventuras de Ibn Battuta: Um Viajante Muçulmano do Século XIV (Berkeley: University of Los Angeles Press, 1976).
Marco Polo, Marco Polo: The Travels, ed. por Ronald Latham (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1958).
Ibn Battuta, As Viagens de Ibn Battuta, ed. por Tim Mackintosh-Smith (Londres: Picador, 2002).

US Search Desktop.
Agradecemos seus comentários sobre como melhorar a Pesquisa do Yahoo. Este fórum é para você fazer sugestões de produtos e fornecer feedback atencioso. Estamos sempre tentando melhorar nossos produtos e podemos usar o feedback mais popular para fazer uma mudança positiva!
Se você precisar de assistência de qualquer tipo, visite nosso fórum de suporte à comunidade ou encontre ajuda individualizada em nosso site de ajuda. Este fórum não é monitorado por nenhum problema relacionado a suporte.
O fórum de comentários do produto do Yahoo agora exige um ID e uma senha válidos do Yahoo para participar.
Agora você precisa fazer login usando sua conta de e-mail do Yahoo para nos fornecer feedback e enviar votos e comentários para as ideias existentes. Se você não tiver um ID do Yahoo ou a senha do seu ID do Yahoo, inscreva-se para obter uma nova conta.
Se você tiver um ID e uma senha válidos do Yahoo, siga estas etapas se quiser remover suas postagens, comentários, votos e / ou perfil do fórum de comentários do produto do Yahoo.
Vote em uma ideia existente () ou publique uma nova ideia…
Idéias quentes Idéias superiores Novas ideias Categoria Status Meu feedback.
Xnxx vedios.
Trazer de volta o layout antigo com pesquisa de imagens.
sim: a única possibilidade (eu acho) enviar todas as informações para (alienvault.
Desinformação na ordem DVD.
Eu pedi DVD / Blueray "AL. A confidencial" tudo que eu consegui foi Blue ray & amp; um contato # para obter o DVD que não funcionou. Eu encomendo minha semana com Marilyn ____DVD / blue ray & amp; Eu peguei os dois - tolamente, assumi que o mesmo se aplicaria a L. A.___ETC não. Eu não tenho uma máquina de raio azul ----- Eu não quero uma máquina de raio azul Eu não quero filmes blueray. Como obtenho minha cópia de DVD de L. A. Confidential?
yahoo, pare de bloquear email.
Passados ​​vários meses agora, o Yahoo tem bloqueado um servidor que pára nosso e-mail.
O Yahoo foi contatado pelo dono do servidor e o Yahoo alegou que ele não bloquearia o servidor, mas ainda está sendo bloqueado. CEASE & amp; DESISTIR.
Não consigo usar os idiomas ingleses no e-mail do Yahoo.
Por favor, me dê a sugestão sobre isso.
Motor de busca no Yahoo Finance.
Um conteúdo que está no Yahoo Finance não aparece nos resultados de pesquisa do Yahoo ao pesquisar por título / título da matéria.
Existe uma razão para isso, ou uma maneira de reindexar?
Procure por "turkey ******" imagens sem ser avisado de conteúdo adulto ou que o mostre.
O Yahoo está tão empenhado em atender os gostos lascivos das pessoas que nem posso procurar imagens de uma marca de "peitos de peru" sem ser avisado sobre conteúdo adulto? Apenas usar a palavra "******" em QUALQUER contexto significa que provavelmente vou pegar seios humanos em toda a página e ter que ser avisado - e passar por etapas para evitá-lo?
Aqui está minha sugestão Yahoo:
Invente um programa de computador que reconheça palavras como 'câncer' ou 'peru' ou 'galinha' em uma frase que inclua a palavra '******' e não assuma automaticamente que a digitação "***** * "significa que estou procurando por ***********.
Descobrir uma maneira de fazer com que as pessoas que ESTÃO procurando *********** busquem ativamente por si mesmas, sem assumir que o resto de nós deve querer ************************************************ uma palavra comum - ****** - que qualquer um pode ver qualquer dia em qualquer seção de carne em qualquer supermercado em todo o país. :(
O Yahoo está tão empenhado em atender os gostos lascivos das pessoas que nem posso procurar imagens de uma marca de "peitos de peru" sem ser avisado sobre conteúdo adulto? Apenas usar a palavra "******" em QUALQUER contexto significa que provavelmente vou pegar seios humanos em toda a página e ter que ser avisado - e passar por etapas para evitá-lo?
Aqui está minha sugestão Yahoo:
Invente um programa de computador que reconheça palavras como 'câncer' ou 'peru' ou 'galinha' em uma frase que inclua a palavra '******' e não assuma automaticamente que a digitação "***** * "significa que estou procurando por mais ...
Por que, quando eu faço login no YahooGroups, todos os grupos aparecem em francês ?!
Quando entro no YahooGroups e ligo para um grupo, de repente tudo começa a aparecer em francês? O que diabos está acontecendo lá ?! Por alguma razão, o sistema está automaticamente me transferindo para o fr. groups. yahoo. Alguma ideia?
consertar o que está quebrado.
Eu não deveria ter que concordar com coisas que eu não concordo com a fim de dizer o que eu acho - eu não tive nenhum problema resolvido desde que comecei a usar o Yahoo - fui forçado a jogar meu antigo mensageiro, trocar senhas, obter novas messenger, disse para usar o meu número de telefone para alertar as pessoas que era o meu código de segurança, receber mensagens diárias sobre o bloqueio de yahoo tentativas de uso (por mim) para quem sabe por que como ele não faz e agora eu obter a nova política aparecer em cada turno - as empresas costumam pagar muito caro pela demografia que os usuários fornecem para você, sem custo, pois não sabem o que você está fazendo - está lá, mas não está bem escrito - e ninguém pode responder a menos que concordem com a política. Já é ruim o suficiente você empilhar o baralho, mas depois não fornece nenhuma opção de lidar com ele - o velho era bom o suficiente - todas essas mudanças para o pod de maré comendo mofos não corta - vou relutantemente estar ativamente olhando - estou cansado do mudanças em cada turno e mesmo aqueles que não funcionam direito, eu posso apreciar o seu negócio, mas o Ameri O homem de negócios pode vender-nos ao licitante mais alto por muito tempo - desejo-lhe boa sorte com sua nova safra de guppies - tente fazer algo realmente construtivo para aqueles a quem você serve - a cauda está abanando o cachorro novamente - isso é como um replay de Washington d c
Eu não deveria ter que concordar com coisas que eu não concordo com a fim de dizer o que eu acho - eu não tive nenhum problema resolvido desde que comecei a usar o Yahoo - fui forçado a jogar meu antigo mensageiro, trocar senhas, obter novas messenger, disse para usar o meu número de telefone para alertar as pessoas que era o meu código de segurança, receber mensagens diárias sobre o bloqueio de yahoo tentativas de uso (por mim) para quem sabe por que isso acontece e agora eu recebo a nova política em cada turno - as empresas costumam pagar muito pela demografia que os usuários fornecem para você ... mais.

Hanseatic League.
Hanseatic League , also called Hansa, German Hanse , organization founded by north German towns and German merchant communities abroad to protect their mutual trading interests. The league dominated commercial activity in northern Europe from the 13th to the 15th century. ( Hanse was a medieval German word for “guild,” or “association,” derived from a Gothic word for “troop,” or “company.”)
The origins of the league are to be found in groupings of traders and groupings of trading towns in two main areas: in the east, where German merchants won a monopoly of the Baltic trade, and in the west, where Rhineland merchants (especially from Cologne [Köln]) were active in the Low Countries and in England. The league came into being when those various associations coalesced, a process encouraged by the natural interdependence of trade in these regions and largely initiated and controlled by those towns, notably Lübeck, which had a central position and a vital interest in trade between the Baltic and northwestern Europe.
Northern German mastery of trade in the Baltic Sea was achieved with striking speed and completeness in the late 12th and early 13th centuries. After its capture by Henry III (the Lion) in 1158, Lübeck became the main base for Westphalian and Saxon merchants expanding northward and eastward. Visby, on the Swedish island of Gotland, was soon established as a major transshipment centre for trade in the Baltic and with Novgorod (now Veliky Novgorod), which was the chief mart for the Russian trade. From Visby, German merchants helped establish important towns on the east coast of the Baltic: Riga, Reval (now Tallinn), Danzig (now Gdańsk), and Dorpat (now Tartu). Thus, by the early 13th century Germans had a near monopoly of long-distance trade in the Baltic.
The dominance achieved by German traders came about largely as a result of cooperation that took two forms: (1) Merchants far from their various hometowns but with a common interest in some particular branch of foreign trade tended increasingly to form Hanses with each other; (2) German towns formed loose unions. Those towns and their policies were dominated by great merchant families, and those families were linked by kinship and by mutual interest. So it is not surprising that from the beginning of the 13th century there appeared associations of cities that increased in size and intimacy and had as their fundamental purpose the removal of obstacles to trade. As early as 1210 Lübeck and Hamburg agreed that a common law obtain between them in certain matters, and that rapprochement led in 1241 to a formal alliance to secure common action against robbers and pirates. This was only one of several such agreements, in which Lübeck was usually prominent, like that of 1259 between Lübeck, Rostock, Wismar, and Stralsund; their principal objectives were always the suppression of piracy and other threats to trade.

Trade and the Transformation of China.
Presented by Daniel T. Griswold at the James and Margaret Tseng Loe Chinese Studies Center Conference, St. Vincent College, PA, on November 6, 2002.
Let me confess up front that I am not a China expert. But one cannot talk about international trade and globalization for even a few minutes without addressing China. We are all students of China now. Today China has become one of the world’s major trading nations, and it is destined to grow more influential in the years ahead.
My remarks today will address four aspects of the topic of China and international trade, what we might call “Chairman Dan’s Four Theses”: The Re-emergence of China as a Trading Nation; U. S.-China Commercial Relations Today; Answering the Critics of Normal Trade Relations; and Tilling the Soil for Human Rights.
If we were to travel back six or seven centuries, we would enter a world where China was the most advanced economy on earth and the most and dynamic force in Asian trade. China organized a professional Navy in 1232, with treadmill-operated paddle-wheelers and catapults that launched heavy stones.
Marco Polo testified to the vigor of China’s international trade during his visits in the late 13th century. The commercial city of Hangzhou had 1 million residents by then, including a merchant class and uprooted refugees. The city embraced relative freedom, change, and travel, and was open to Arab and Hindu learning. The citizens of Hangzhou had a saying: “Vegetables from the east, water from the west, wood from the south, and rice from the north.”
In those days, Chinese plied the Indian Ocean with fleets of ocean going merchant junks, 100 feet long and 25 feet wide, carrying 120 tons of cargo and 60 crew. Those ships visited Indonesia, Ceylon, and the west coast of India. By the 13th century, the Chinese had developed dry docks and gunpowder bombs—300 years before those were seen in the West.
Beginning under Emperor Zhu Di, the Chinese launched seven official naval expeditions between 1405 and 1431 to Indonesia, India, Arabia, and East Africa. The expeditions were lead by the eunuch officer Zheng He. These “Treasure ships” were the largest in the world, 400 feet long by 160 feet wide (vs. 85 feet long for the Santa Maria). The ships were multi-decked, with nine masts and sails of red silk traversed with laths of bamboo for more durability and precise steering. Each ship carried hundreds of sailors and had 15 or more watertight compartments, and 60 cabins. At 7,800 tons of displacement, they were the largest ships in the world until those of the British Navy after 1800. In all, China built 250 such ships as part of a major shipbuilding program that would have been unimaginable in Europe at the time.
The Treasure Ships were sent on huge trade missions. The first, in 1405, consisted of a fleet of 317 ships with 28,000 Chinese. What a sight that must have been! On a mission to Hormuz, in the Persian Gulf, Chinese traded porcelains and silks in exchange for sapphires, rubies, oriental topaz, pearls, coral beads, amber, woolens, and carpets, along with lions, leopards, and Arabian horses. But these were not market-opening missions, but more diplomatic in nature, a showing of the flag. No attempt was made to establish bases for trade or military objectives. The missions were very costly for the Chinese government and not profitable in a commercial sense.
The bureaucratic mandarins, who detested commerce, soon prevailed over the rival eunuchs. At its peak in early 1400s, the great Ming navy consisted of 3,500 ships, but the number fell in half by 1440, and rapidly diminished after that. With the death of Zhu Zhanji in 1435, the new emperor recalled the fleets. In 1477, one of leading eunuchs called for writings of Zheng He to stimulate interest in naval expeditions, but the vice president of the ministry of war ordered them destroyed, calling them “deceitful exaggerations of bizarre things far removed from the testimony of people’s eyes and ears.” By 1500 it was a capital crime to build a ship with more than two masts. In 1525 coastal authorities were enjoined to destroy all ocean-going vessels, and in 1551 it was declared a crime to set sail in a multi-masted ship.
In 1400, China was in every way superior to West: in technology, living standards, and global influence. But the country became enveloped in a smug self-sufficiency, cultural and economic inwardness, a closed and centralized political system, and an anti-commercial culture. In the 15th century, China turned its back on the world economy. It even abandoned naval defenses. Its highly educated elite was uninterested in Western technology and military potential. A British mission in 1793 brought 600 cases of presents, including chronometers, telescopes, a planetarium, chemical and metal products. Chinese officials rebuffed the foreigners, asserting that “there is nothing we lack-we have never set much store on strange or ingenious objects, nor do we want any more of your country’s manufactures.”
So for more than 500 years, from the 15th to the 20th century, China’s economy slipped further behind the rest of the world. As late as 1820, the gross domestic product of China was still 30 percent higher than the total GDP of Western Europe and its settlements, but it was only one-twelfth the size by 1950. The Chinese economy was not open in the 19th century despite trade treaties and Western encroachment. Its trade was conducted in self-contained trade zones with little impact on the rest of China. The share of exports in China’s GDP was only 1.2 percent in 1913 at the height of pre-war globalization in the West. The Taiping Rebellion in the mid-19th century and World War II, Civil War, and communist convulsions in 20th devastated China’s economy.
The economic reforms that began in late 1970s reversed 500 years of history. China’s trade with the rest of the world has grown from only $20 billion at the beginning of the reforms to more than $500 billion in 2001. China is now the world’s sixth largest exporter of goods and also the world’s sixth largest importer. In the past decade, China has reduced its average tariff from 43 percent to 15 percent, and those barriers will fall further as it implements the agreement it signed to join to World Trade Organization. So much for China being a closed economy!
I believe the re-emergence of China as a trading nation is one of the most important and far-reaching developments in the last, oh, half millennium or so. After 500 years on the sidelines, China has rejoined the global economy.
Since China began to unilaterally open its market, the people of China and the United States have enjoyed a growing and mutually beneficial trade relationship. From practically nothing in 1980, two-way U. S.-China trade grew to more than $120 billion in 2001. China today is America’s fourth largest trading partner. In 2001, Americans imported $102 billion worth of goods from China while we exported $19 billion-leaving a bilateral trade deficit with China of $83 billion.
Since 1980, the United States has allowed Chinese products to enter the U. S. market at the same tariff rates applied to our other trading partners. But the extension of so-called normal trade relations to China was always conditioned on the president granting a waiver to the Jackson-Vanik amendment (a relic of the Cold War that conditions trade with communist countries on their emigration policies). Each year congressional opponents of trade with China would try in vain to override the waiver, and in 2000 Congress made normal trade relations permanent to clear the way for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization.
So what in the world do we buy from China? It’s a running joke with my kids that we cannot go to the store without buying something—clothing, toys, household goods—made in China. Three-quarters of what Americans import from China are toys and other miscellaneous manufactured goods: footwear-1 billion pairs of shoes a year-furniture, lighting fixtures, office machines, household electronics, electrical appliances, and clothing. Wal-Mart alone will import an estimated $12 billion worth of goods from China in 2002. Those goods mean lower prices, more choice, and more real income for American families.
On a much smaller scale, China buys American-made aircraft, telecommunications equipment, scientific instruments, oil seeds and fruits, electrical machinery and appliances, data processing machines, and fertilizers.
Why do we run such a large bilateral trade deficit with China? We are the world’s number one consumer society and China has become the world’s workshop for consumer goods, so it should be no surprise that we have become China’s best customer. On the other hand, we are the world’s leading high-end manufacturer, while China remains a relatively poor country. In sum, we are more willing and able to buy what the people of China make than they are willing or able to buy what we make.
Despite warnings, the United States is not dangerously “dependent” on trade with China. Our imports to and exports from China remain a small fraction of our total trade. If anything, China is more dependent on trade with the United States than vice versa. Both our imports and exports with China are less than 10 percent of our total trade, but 38 percent of China’s exports go to the United States. If our trade relations were disrupted, by an outbreak of protectionism or a hot or cold war, both countries would suffer economically but China would suffer more.
And despite the warning that U. S. factories will soon lock up and move to China, American investment in the mainland remains modest. At the end of 2001, American companies owned $7 billion worth of direct manufacturing investment in China. That is less than 2 percent of the total stock of U. S. manufacturing FDI abroad, and far less than the $35 billion in manufacturing investment American companies own in the tiny Netherlands, population 15 million. Annual outflows of manufacturing investment to China remain a tiny fraction of what American companies invest domestically in the U. S economy, and what the rest of the world invests in China.
Criticism of U. S. trade with China takes two basic forms: that our trade with China, and by this the critics invariably mean what we import from China, threatens our national security, and that it threatens our economy.
Let’s examine the national security argument first. The most legitimate concern about trade and national security is what we export to China. The U. S. government wields extensive powers to block exports to China of sensitive military and so-called dual-use technology-and the government should use that power when necessary. We should not be selling cutting-edge military technology to China that could then be sold to our enemies or turned against us in any way. But that is not what really bothers the critics of trade with China. What they object to are imports from China. They believe in a simple, what I would call a simplistic, formula that says: When we buy goods from China, China becomes richer, and the richer China becomes, the more it can fund its military to threaten American security.
That was the conclusion this summer of the U. S.-China Security Review Commission. The commission was established by Congress in 2000 when it approved permanent normal trade relations. In its first annual report, the commission warns that, through our trade and investment ties with China, “we are strengthening a country that could challenge us economically, politically, and militarily.”
“If China becomes rich but not free,” the commission warns, “the United States may face a wealthy, powerful nation that could be hostile toward our democratic values, to us, and in direct competition with us for influence in Asia and beyond.”
The commission’s national security critue is fundamentally flawed, for at least two major reasons. First, while trade with the United States has been important for China’s development, it has not been the most important factor. Far more important has been China’s own internal liberalization, starting with its farm sector in the late 1970s, and then expanding to the privatization of its state-owned sector, repeal of price controls, and the unilateral opening of its economy to foreign competition. If the U. S. market were far less open to Chinese goods than it actually is, China would still have grown rapidly in the last 20 years, although not quite as rapidly as it actually has.
Second, even if it were possible, through changes in U. S. trade policy, to put the brakes on China’s economic growth, would we even want to? From a humanitarian point of view, a dramatic slowdown in China’s growth would cause hardship for hundreds of millions of families and condemn millions of children to lives of perpetual poverty without hope for further education and upward mobility. And from a foreign policy point of view, a still-poor, stagnant, and frustrated China may be more unstable and hostile to American interests than a China that is advancing economically. In fact, a policy of disengagement from China could be self-fulfilling, creating the very enemy its proponents claim to be protecting us from. In sum, it would be cynical and foolish to stake our national security on a policy designed to keep 1 billion people isolated and poor.
The other major criticism of trade with China is that is threatens America’s economy. Here the critics believe in an equally simplistic formula that says: Every widget we import from China means one less widget we make ourselves, which means a weaker U. S. economy and a potentially dangerous dependence on foreign widgets. And here too the argument against trade with China is fundamentally flawed.
First, the types of goods we import from China are not important for the U. S. military. Recall the list of top imports from China: toys, shoes, clothing, office machines, household appliances and household electronics. American soldiers may be buying those goods at the local Wal-Mart or PX, but they are not being procured by the Pentagon. The China Security Commission warns that the U. S. steel industry may be jeopardized by Chinese imports, but the Commerce Department has already investigated the national security impact of steel imports and found no connection.
Second, imports from China do not weaken the U. S. economy, cause unemployment, or threaten our industrial base. Imports strengthen our economy by raising real wages for families, providing lower-cost inputs for business, and spurring innovation and higher productivity through competition. Like technology, trade does cause certain industries to decline, thus eliminating some jobs, but it also creates new opportunities for wealth and job creation. In an economy with a reasonably flexible labor market, jobs eliminated by technology and trade will be fully offset by the creation of new jobs.
A blatant example of overblown rhetoric about the trade deficit and jobs occurred on the eve of the vote on permanent normal trade relations in May 2000, during a segment of the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer on PBS. In summing up why the House should reject permanent normal trade relations with China in a vote the next day, AFL-CIO executive Richard Trumka asserted:
No one is saying isolate China. That’s the smoke screen they blow out because they don’t have the facts. Look, we have a $70 billion trade deficit with China. The U. S. International Trade Commission came out with a study yesterday [Monday, May 22] saying, if you give them permanent NTR status, two things will happen: We’ll lose one million jobs, and the trade deficit will increase.
Trumka’s sweeping claim offers a textbook example of how opponents of trade liberalization abuse trade deficit figures to serve their agenda. In fact, the U. S. International Trade Commission had issued no such study that week on trade with China. The commission’s most recent study on the impact of China PNTR had been released in August 1999, almost a year earlier, and it contained no estimate of job gains or losses.
The actual source of the figure of one million jobs lost was a paper released the week before by the Economic Policy Institute, a union-aligned, non-profit organization. The EPI had used numbers from the 1999 USITC study to extrapolate an estimate of future bilateral trade deficits with China. It then crunched the hypothetical trade deficit numbers to estimate a total loss of almost 900,000 jobs during the next decade if Congress were to approve PNTR with China. But the EPI estimate of job losses was based on three whoppingly false assumptions.
One serious error of the EPI study was to misapply the USITC’s estimates for the growth in China trade. The USITC study only offered a one-year, static estimate of the impact of Chinese tariff liberalization on the U. S. trade deficit. The ITC study didn’t even attempt to estimate the number of American jobs that would be created or eliminated by the further opening of the Chinese market.
The EPI’s second crucial error was then to assume that rising imports from China automatically mean lost jobs in the U. S. economy. But rising imports need not and typically do not translate into a net loss of jobs. In fact, the growth of real goods imports and manufacturing output tend to be positively correlated. That is, as manufacturing output rises in the United States so too do imports of goods, adjusted for price changes. As with so many other economic indicators, the same economic expansion that spurs manufacturing output also attracts more imports and enlarges the trade deficit.
Trade critics such as EPI wrongly assume that every import from China displaces domestic production, eliminating jobs in the economy. In reality, much of what we import from China, such as toys, shoes, and clothing, substitutes for imports from other low-wage producers. Another sizeable portion of our imports consists of intermediate inputs, which are then assembled into U. S.-made products by American manufacturers. That helps to explain why there is no correlation between rising manufacturing imports from China and falling manufacturing output.
A third critical error of the EPI study was to consider the bilateral trade balance with China in isolation. While a change in trade policy can affect a particular bilateral deficit, the increased bilateral deficit tends to be offset by changes in other bilateral balances. The ITC study confirms this. The USITC estimated that China’s lower tariffs would cause America’s overall trade deficit to shrink slightly. Although America’s bilateral deficit with China would increase within the USITC’s limited model, our trade balance with other countries would “improve” enough to more than offset the increased deficit with China. The USITC estimated that America’s total exports would growth by $1.9 billion while imports would grow by $1.1 billion, decreasing the overall U. S. trade deficit by $0.8 billion. If you believe EPI’s own faulty methodology, the smaller overall U. S. trade deficit caused by China’s lower tariffs should lead to an increase in U. S. jobs, not a decrease.
Trade with China is about more than jobs and incomes. Around the world, trade and the development it has spurred have created a more hospitable climate for civil and political freedoms. The economic openness of globalization allows citizens greater access to technology and ideas through fax machines, satellite dishes, mobile telephones, Internet access, and face-to-face meetings with people from other countries. Rising incomes and economic freedom help to nurture a more educated and politically aware middle class. People who are economically free over time come to want and expect to exercise political and civil liberty as well. Catholic social thinker Michael Novak identified this as the “Wedge Theory”:
Capitalist practices, runs the theory, bring contact with the ideas and practices of the free societies, generate the economic growth that gives political confidence to a rising middle class, and raise up successful business leaders who come to represent a political alternative to military or party leaders. In short, capitalist firms wedge a democratic camel’s nose under the authoritarian tent.
The interplay of economic openness and political and civil freedom is admittedly complex, and the question of causation remains unsettled, but the two phenomena are clearly linked in the real world. In the past 25 years, as an expanding share of the world has turned away from centralized economic controls and toward a more open global market, political and civil freedoms have also spread. Since 1975, the share of the world’s governments classified by Freedom House as democracies has risen sharply, especially since the late 1980s when globalization began to gather steam. Many of those new democracies are low - and middle-income countries that have simultaneously liberalized and opened their economies.
When we compare countries according to their economic openness and their degree of political and civil freedom, the connection becomes even more evident. People who live in countries relatively open to international trade and investment are far more likely to enjoy full political and civil liberties than those who live in countries that are relatively closed. Among the top two quintiles of nations ranked according to their economic openness, 90 percent are rated “Free” by Freedom House and not a single one is rated “Not Free.” In the bottom quintile of openness (i. e. those with the most closed economies), fewer than 20 percent are rated “Free” and more than half are rated “Not Free.” In other words, countries that maintain a relatively open economy are more than four times more likely to be free of political and civil oppression than countries that remain closed.
Recent decades have witnessed dramatic examples of how economic freedom and openness till the soil for civil and political reform. Twenty years ago, both South Korea and Taiwan were military dictatorships without free elections or full civil liberties. Today, thanks in part to economic growth and globalization, both are thriving democracies where citizens enjoy the full range of civil liberties and where opposition parties have won elections against long-time ruling parties. In Mexico, more than a decade of economic and trade reforms helped lay the foundation for the historic July 2, 2000, election of the opposition candidate Vicente Fox, ending 71 years of one-party rule by the PRI. Internal economic reforms and the North American Free Trade Agreement helped to undermine the dominance of the PRI over Mexican political life. Alejandro Junco, publisher of the opposition newspaper Reforma, noted after the PRI’s historic defeat, “As the years have passed, and with international mechanisms like NAFTA, the government doesn’t control the newsprint, they don’t have the monopoly on telecommunications, there’s a consciousness among citizens that the president can’t control everybody.”
While genuine political reform has been absent so far in China, and dissent is still brutally suppressed, economic reform and globalization give reason to hope for political reforms. After two decades of reform and rapid growth, an expanding middle class is experiencing for the first time the independence of home ownership, travel abroad, and cooperation with others in economic enterprise free of government control. The number of telephone lines, mobile phones, and Internet users has risen exponentially in the past decade. Tens of thousands of Chinese students are studying abroad each year.
China’s economic reforms have opened the door for religious witnessing. More than 100 Western missionary organizations are active in China. Those organizations have distributed millions of Chinese language Bibles in China. Thousands of Christian workers who are tent-making as English teachers and in other occupations are able to minister to the growing body of believers in China. All this would have been unthinkable 25 years ago when China was still isolated from the global economy.
All this must be good news for individual freedom in China, and a growing problem for the government. A recent study by the Chinese Communist Party’s influential Central Organization Department noted with concern that “as the economic standing of the affluent stratum has increased, so too has its desire for greater political standing.” The study concluded that such a development would have a “profound impact on social and political life” in China.
Globalization and economic development do not guarantee political reform in China or anywhere else, but the track record of economic engagement is far more promising than the failed record of sanctions and economic isolation. Four decades of an almost total U. S. embargo against Cuba have yet to soften Fidel Castro’s totalitarian rule. Sanctions against Burma (a. k.a. Myanmar) have only worsened the condition of the very people we are trying to help without bringing any progress toward democracy and freedom. The folly of imposing trade sanctions in the name of promoting human rights abroad is that it deprives people in the target countries of the technological tools and economic opportunities that can help to free them from tyranny.
For the past two decades, globalization, human rights and democracy have been marching forward together, haltingly, not always and everywhere in step, but in a way that unmistakably shows they are interconnected. By encouraging more trade and market liberalization in China, we not only help to raise growth rates and incomes, promote higher standards, and feed, clothe and house the poor; we also spread political and civil freedoms.
President Bush, in The National Security Strategy of the United States of America document released in 2002, wrote that, “Chinese leaders are discovering that economic freedom is the only source of national wealth. In time, they will find that social and political freedom is the only source of national greatness.” Opponents of trade with China see the rising incomes and falling poverty of hundreds of millions of people as a threat to our security and well-being. Instead, we should see China’s rising prosperity as an immediate blessing for mankind. And we should understand that trade offers the best hope that China will one day join the community of nations that are free and democratic just as it now seeks to join those that are open and prosperous.

Trading system in 13th century

Venice played a major role in reopening the Mediterranean economy to West European commerce and developing links with Northern Europe. It created an institutional basis for commercial capitalism, made major progress in shipping technology, and helped transfer Asian and Egyptian technology in cane sugar production and processing, silk textiles, glassblowing and jewellery to the West.
Venice was the most successful of the North Italian city states in creating and maintaining a republic dominated by a merchant capitalist elite. Thanks to its geographic position and willingness to defend itself, it was able to guarantee its autonomy and freedom from exactions by feudal landlords and monarchs.
It created political and legal institutions which guaranteed property rights and the enforceability of contracts. It was a pioneer in developing foreign exchange and credit markets, banking and accountancy. It created what was effectively a government bond market, starting with compulsory loans on which interest was paid regularly. Its fiscal system was efficient and favourable to merchant profits and the accumulation of capital. The revenues came from excise levies and property taxes based on cadastral surveys.
It was a tolerant and fairly secular state where foreign merchants (Armenians, Greeks and Jews) could operate as freely as locals. Although it was theoretically part of the catholic world, it enjoyed privileged relations with the Byzantine empire. It buttressed its ecclesiastical independence by acquiring the relics of St. Mark from Alexandria in 828. It was effectively independent of both Pope and Patriarch.
Venetian diplomacy was highly professional, pragmatic, opportunistic and dedicated to the pursuit of its commercial interests. It adjusted amazingly well to political changes. In the ninth and tenth centuries its main commerce was to provision Constantinople with grain and wine from Italy, wood and slaves from Dalmatia and salt from its lagoons, taking silk and spices in return. Towards the end of the eleventh century, Byzantium was under pressure from the Seljuk Turks who seized Anatolia, and Frankish incursions into its Southern Italian territories. Venice secured commercial privileges (exemption from excise taxes) from Byzantium in 1082 in return for help in bolstering its naval defences. In 1204, by contrast, it played a major role in persuading the leaders of the fourth crusade to target Constantinople instead of Islam. As a result Venice acquired bases in Dalmatia and an empire in the Aegean. It took the southern half of the Peloponnese, Corfu and Crete. It occupied nearly half of Constantinople and gained access to trade in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. In 1261, the Byzantine Emperor recaptured Constantinople and gave trade preferences and a territorial base to Venice’s rival, Genoa. However, Venice retained its Greek colonies and Venetian shipping was soon able to re–enter the Black Sea where trade was booming due to the Mongol reopening of the silk route through Central Asia.
West European crusaders successfully attacked the Syrian and Palestinian coast and established small christian states in Antioch, Acre and Jerusalem between 1099 and 1291. They gave commercial privileges to Pisan and Genoan traders who had helped finance their conquest. The Venetians had not helped, but nevertheless managed to establish a trading base in Tyre.
The Turkish Mameluke regime recaptured Syria and Palestine in 1291 and ruled Egypt until 1517. Here too, Venice managed to establish a privileged trading relationship, buying a large part of the Asian spices which the Karimi merchants of Alexandria brought to Egypt from Asia via the Red Sea. In return the Venetians sold metals, armour, woollens and slaves. The slaves came from the Balkans and Russia: males were destined for service in the Mameluke army, females for their harems.
When the man Turks captured Constantinople in 1453, Venice quickly negotiated the maintenance of its trading rights, but in 1479, the mans closed their access to the Black Sea. In 1517, they took over Egypt and terminated most of the Venetian trade in spices.
Venice had important connections with Northern Europe. Trade with Flanders was carried out mainly at the Champagne fairs where Italian merchants bought woollen goods and sold silk, spices, alum, sugar and lacquer8. When the sea route was opened between the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic, trade with Flanders was carried out directly by ship.
A second route linked Venice with Augsburg, Nuremberg, Prague and Vienna via the Brenner Pass. German merchants brought metals and metal products (including silver). Venetians traded these metals up the Po Valley and in the Mediterranean. In 1318 the Fondaco dei Tedeschi was created in Venice to provide for the trading needs and lodging of German merchants.
In building up its trade, Venice created a political empire. In 1171, the city had about 66 000 inhabitants, and was one of the three biggest in Western Europe until the sixteenth century when its population peaked around 170 000. Venice experienced three demographic catastrophes. In 1347–48, nearly 40 per cent of the population died when a galley brought the plague from the Black Sea port of Caffa. Two other attacks occurred in 1575–77 and 1630; each killing about a third of the population of the city.
The Empire overseas (dominio da mar) included about half a million people. Between 1388 and 1499, Venice acquired territory on the Italian mainland (terraferma) which included Udine, Friuli, Vicenza, Padua, Verona, Bergamo, Rovigo and Cremona. In 1557 the population of these territories was about 1.5 million.
The Venetian state played a leading role in commercial activity, being the major shipbuilder, leasing state–owned galleys to private enterprise, arranging the organisation and timing of convoys. It developed types of ship suitable for Venetian commerce and the conditions of trade in the Mediterranean. This state activity reduced costs for private traders by making commerce more secure from enemy attack. It also permitted smaller traders, with limited capital, to participate in international trade.
The biggest enterprise in Venice was the Arsenal, a public shipyard created in 1104. It was operative for centuries, and employed thousands of workers.
There were major changes in ship construction and navigation technues between the tenth and fourteenth centuries. Roman ships had been constructed hull first, held together by careful watertight cabinetwork of mortice and tenon; the second stage was the insertion of ribs and braces. In the eleventh century there was a switch which made a major reduction in costs. The keel and ribs were made first and a hull of nailed planks was added, using fibre and pitch to make the ships watertight. A later development was the stern–post rudder which replaced trailing oars as a more effective means for steering ships. The power of the rudders was strengthened by use of cranks and pulleys. There were improvements in sails, notably the introduction of a triangular lateen rig set at an angle to the mast instead of a rectangular sail square to the mast. There was a long run increase in the size of ships.
Soon after 1270, the compass came into use in the Mediterranean. This, together with improved charts, made it possible to sail all year round. Previously ships trading with Egypt had not ventured out between October and April. With the compass the same ship could make two return trips a year from Venice to Alexandria instead of one.
There were two main kinds of Venetian ship. General purpose cargo ships (“cogs”) were built in private shipyards. Their length was about three times their breadth, and they relied entirely on sails. Galleys for passengers, high value cargo and naval duties were built in the Arsenal. These were longer, had a wide beam and a crew of 200 most of whom were oarsmen. Galleys were speedier, more manoeuvrable for entering and leaving harbour, and for occasions when there was no wind. The general Venetian practice was to have 25 benches on each side of the galley, each bench having three oarsmen. The benches were set at an angle and the oars were of different lengths so that the rowers would not interfere with each other. On such a ship there would be 150 oarsmen and about 30 crossbowmen for defence and attack, who would also take turns at rowing. Galleys were owned by the state and rented out for each venture to the highest bidder in public auctions. Galleys also acted as public carriers, as those who leased the ships had to accept goods from other merchants if they had spare capacity.
In 1291, the Genoese defeated a Moroccan fleet controlling the straits of Gibraltar, and opened the way for European commerce from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. Thereafter Venetian galleys used this route to trade with London and Bruges.
Although international trade, banking, shipbuilding and associated trades in timber, carpentry, rope and sailmaking etc. were the biggest sectors of the Venetian economy, there were also sizeable manufacturing activities producing goods for local use and export. One of the earliest was the glass industry which had already started in the tenth century. Venice was a pioneer in glassblowing technology in Europe and made glasses, goblets, pitchers, dishes, bottles, vases, mirrors, jewellery, candelabra and decorative products of very high quality. From the thirteenth century Venetians produced delicate, carefully blown sand–glasses as a time–keeping device for mariners. From the fourteenth century onwards they started making spectacles — an Italian invention which greatly increased the productivity of artisans and scholars. Angelo Barovier, the most famous glassblower of the fifteenth century, perfected the process for making crystal. By that time, polychrome, engraved, filigree, enamelled and gold– leafed glassware was available in a profuse variety of designs. In 1291 all glassblowing was shifted to the island of Murano by decree of the Maggior Consilio. This enabled Venice to keep tighter control of its trade and technological secrets.
Equally precocious were the skills and products of Venetian goldsmiths, mosaicists, woodcarvers and decorative artists who were in heavy demand in turning the inside of churches, civic monuments and private palaces into works of art. Venetian style was influenced by the work of previous generations of mosaicists and iconographers in Ravenna and the thirteenth century inflow of objects looted from Constantinople.
The trade with Asia in raw silk and silk products eventually led to import substitution in Europe. Silk production had already spread from China to India and Syria, and came to Italy in the twelfth century — initially to Lucca, then to Venice, Florence, Genoa, Milan and Bologna, and later to Lyon in France. Within the Arab world, silk production came to Spain from Syria. Venetian silk production is documented as early as the thirteenth century. The Venetian government regulated production to guarantee quality, keep out competitors and reduce the risk of industrial espionage. The silk, satin and velvet products of Venice were of the highest quality, and designs were a distinctive mix of indigenous creativity and oriental influence. Multicoloured velvet brocades, often executed with gold and silver thread, were produced as items of ceremonial clothing for Venice’s governing elite, for furniture, wall hangings, table coverings, decorative items for gondolas etc. These products made a substantial contribution to Venetian exports.
Another important field was book production. In the ninth and tenth centuries, scribes and illuminators were mainly active on sacred books in the scriptoria of monasteries. Later there were civic records, histories, translations of Aristotle and other Greek texts destined for the libraries of San Marco, ducal, civic and private collectors. This gave employment to professional scribes, bookbinders, specialists in ornamented calligraphy and illustration. Less than 15 years after Gutenberg’s invention of printing, a German immigrant brought the technue to Venice in 1469. It led to an enormous improvement in the productivity of the industry, with print runs up to 4 500 copies. A very much larger proportion of output was destined for export than had been the case for manuscript books. Venice quickly became the principal Italian typographical centre, and one of the biggest in Europe. By the middle of the sixteenth century, some 20 000 editions had been published. Venetian publishing helped invigorate the cultural and intellectual life of Europe by providing music scores, maps, books on medical matters and translations of the Greek classics. The Aldine Press (set up in 1494) edited and published original Greek texts, and Venice became the major publisher of books for the Greek–speaking world.
Sugar was another major product. Venice created plantation agriculture and processing facilities with slave labour in Crete and Cyprus, using technues borrowed from Syria. Venetian practice was copied later by the Portuguese in Madeira and in Brazil.
The Venetian role in the spice trade was greatly reduced at the beginning of the sixteenth century because of restrictions on trade with Syria and Egypt imposed by the new man authorities, and competition from direct Portuguese shipments from Asia. Lane suggests that Venetian spice imports fell from around 1 600 tons a year towards the end of the fifteenth century to less than 500 tons by the first decade of the sixteenth century. Lane thought that the absolute size of the pepper component of these shipments had recovered by the 1560s, but Venice’s leading role in this trade had obviously evaporated.
Venetian shipping also faced increased competition on Western routes to England and Flanders, and its sugar industry in Crete and Cyprus declined because of competition from Portuguese production in Madeira and later in Brazil.
There were also changes in shipbuilding technology in the Atlantic economies which quickly rendered the oared Venetian galley obsolete. The two main changes were in the rigging of round ships and the development of firearms during the fifteenth century. Lane (1966, pp. 15–16) described these changes as follows: “ The transformation of the one–masted cog into a full–rigged, three–masted ship possessed of spritsail, topsail and mizzen lateen occurred about the middle of the century — the sailing ships of 1485 differed less in appearance from the sailing ships of 1785 than they did from those of 1425 — equally important in robbing the merchant galley of the special security which had alone justified its existence was the increase in the use of guns in naval warfare. ”.
As a result there was a sharp decline in the main product of the Arsenal and a rise in the share of cogs in the Venetian merchant fleet. There was increased purchase by Venetian merchants of ships from abroad, as problems of adapting to technological change were compounded by much poorer Venetian access to cheap timber than shipbuilders in the Atlantic economies.
From 1500 onwards, a significant proportion of Venetian capital was reoriented to agrarian reclamation and development and creation of Palladian villas and country estates in the terraferma .
Over the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Venice did not expand much in population or per capita income, but it remained one of the richest parts of Italy and Europe until overtaken by the Dutch in the seventeenth century.